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Essays on the 
Economics of Religion, Charitable Giving, and Youth Crime 
 
 
Brian J. Osoba 
 
 
This dissertation includes essays on the application of economics to areas previously 
thought to be the domain of sociology, psychology, and political science.  Chapter 1 
introduces the paths that economics has blazed into the areas of religion, charitable 
giving, crime, and government formation.  The second chapter examines the functions 
that risk and time preference play in the strength of an individual’s religious belief.  The 
results illustrate that individuals treat religion like other goods exhibiting uncertainty and 
a delayed expected future payoff.  Chapter 3 investigates the role of prestige and warm 
glow in the market for charitable giving.  The results indicate that contributions to faith-
based organizations depend on the strength of the warm glow effect relative to that of the 
prestige effect.  The fourth chapter utilizes a model of government evolution to explore 
the formation of Los Angeles street gangs. The results indicate that already existing 
violence in the inner city causes youths to join gangs.  It is also shown that the existence 
of gangs actually promotes an overall net decrease in crime.  Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings of the dissertation, provides concluding remarks, and discusses opportunities for 
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An Introduction to the Economics of Religion,  
Charitable Giving, and Youth Crime 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This dissertation looks at religion, altruism, and crime; topics that, until recently, were 
considered by economists as being primarily within the realm of sociology, psychology 
and political science.  Although the respective literatures are growing, there are a great 
many areas that still need to be explored using standard economic reasoning.  In addition, 
research in these areas helps to cross the artificial boundaries that separate economics 
from the other social sciences.  Such crossovers may eventually help lead to 
comprehensive social science models of human behavior.  Because my research 
comprises these lesser known areas, I will provide a brief introduction to each in order to 
acquaint the reader to the subjects.  I will also explain the relevance of each area to 
economics and vice versa. 
 
1.2  The Economics of Religion 
A popular saying goes “when in polite company, avoid talking about politics and 
religion.”  As anyone who has ever broken this law of social politeness may have 
witnessed, religion is an especially passionate issue for people.  Perhaps one reason for 
this passion is that religion, as stated by Iannaccone (1995), is the “ultimate credence 
good.”  Religious individuals accept the existence of their respective belief system 
completely on “faith”, without any tangible empirical evidence.  For many individuals, 
religious beliefs have significant influence on their daily activities, many of which are of 
significant interest to economists. 
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Over the last fifty years, surveys in the United States have consistently reported that 
around 95 percent of the adult population subscribes to a belief in “God or a universal 
spirit.”  In addition, approximately 75 percent of adults belief in an afterlife.  Religious 
beliefs, according to the sociological and economic literature, may influence an 
individual’s respective behavior patterns, like consumption (e.g., no alcohol, fish on 
Fridays), labor supply (e.g., no work on Saturday and/or Sunday), and voting issues (e.g., 
abortion, death penalty, disregard of atheist political candidates) to varying degrees.  
Most major religions obligate adherents to behave according to a certain code of conduct.  
Also, the belief systems of these religions may predispose adherents to prefer one type of 
market or political system over another.   
Throughout history, religious beliefs and institutions have been instrumental in 
shaping government policies and actions.  These include state views on property rights, 
warfare (including the Crusades and much present-day terrorism), and market issues such 
the levying of interest on debt.  However, the influence works in the opposite direction as 
well.  Finke (1990) and Iannaccone, Finke, and Starke (1997), among many others, have 
looked at how government policies on religion have affected the levels of participation 
and membership in religious activities.  Perhaps not surprising to economists, a “free 
market for religion”, where religious freedom is highest, results in increased religious 
competition and more specialization.  In fact, participation is lower in countries in which 
there exists a government-supported religion.  So, competition in the religious market 
appears to be good for consumers of religion. 
Consistently high proportions of the U.S. population have remained religious over 
time.  The proportion of Americans believing in the existence of a god or universal spirit 
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has hovered around 95% for the last 60 years.  Belief in an afterlife has ranged between 
71% and 76% over the same time period, with most of those people believing in a 
heaven, where those who have led good lives are eternally rewarded.1    If so many 
individuals believe in “life” after death, it is important as economists to understand how 
such thinking affects human economic behavior.  For example, do people consume 
differently knowing that they likely will be “consuming” again after death?  Are religious 
people more reckless, as death only expedites the onset of “eternal bliss”?  In fact, some 
of the earliest economic research on religion uses models of the current life and an 
afterlife to attempt to answer similar questions.   
Weekly church attendance rates for U.S. Christians over the last 60 years have 
lingered around 40 percent for Protestants and about 50 percent for Catholics.  What 
drives so many millions of individuals to allocate their scarce time resources each week 
to attend worship services?  Instead of spending time at church, these individuals could 
be providing extra labor supply or consuming additional leisure goods.  Certainly this 
weekly religious devotion has some impact on economic performance.  In fact, Barro and 
McCleary (2002) looks at the influence that religion plays on a region’s pattern of 
economic development.  On the other hand, the effect of economic factors on religious 
devotion was first studied by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975).  In their seminal paper, they 
find an individual’s hourly wage to have a negative effect on church attendance.  Since 
then, several others have studied the role that similar opportunity costs play on church 
attendance.   
 
                                                 
1 Incidentally, the belief in a hell has ranged between 53% and 60% of survey respondents.  Perhaps this 
discrepancy indicates that people are somewhat optimistic. 
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1.3  Economics, Altruism, and Charitable Giving 
Friedman (1990) defines altruism as the “devotion to the welfare of others, regard for 
others as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or selfishness.”  As such, it seems that 
the very existence of altruism violates one of the main assumptions of standard economic 
models; that individuals are self-interested.  However, economists should not worry.  
Incentives still govern human behavior, even when the activities appear to be utility-
reducing.  Economic theories of altruism abound, all based on some variation of the self-
interest assumption.  The standard paradigm explains how changes in incentives will lead 
to changes in an individual’s level of altruism.  In fact, as shown by Becker (1976), 
altruism can actively promote one’s own interests.  Empirical studies have confirmed 
these theories.  
Charitable giving is an expression of altruism.  In the U.S., faith-based charitable 
giving is particularly high.  In 2003, total charitable giving equaled $240.72 billion, or 
2.2 percent of the U.S. GDP.  Donations to religious activities were $86.39 billion, 
representing approximately 35% of all charitable giving.2  This money could have been 
spent on other, more tangible goods and services for the individuals and their families.  
So, what drives individuals to part with so much income, especially when it typically 
goes to strangers?   
Several models have risen to prominence recently in the charitable giving literature to 
answer this question.  Prestige Motive Models explain charitable giving as a way to buy 
social recognition and membership in an exclusive club of elite individuals.  Warm Glow 
Models look at the joy individuals gain from acts of charity.  Just as people may buy 
access to the cable channel, Comedy Central, to experience the pleasure of laughter, so 
                                                 
2 Source:  American Association of Fundraising Counsel (www.aafrc.org). 
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too do people “buy” happiness through charitable giving.  In Public Goods Models, 
rational actors contribute to charitable activities in order to benefit from the positive 
externalities such support creates.  For example, by contributing to an organization like 
the Police Athletic League, the contributor may experience less crime or harassment from 
groups of teens that otherwise may wander the neighborhoods looking for “recreational 
activities.” 
 
1.4  Crime, Government, and Youth Gang Membership 
In the early 1970s, fewer than 300 cities cited having problems with youth gangs.  Since 
then, gangs have been identified in all 50 states, with over 2,500 cities reporting problems 
by the late 1990s.3  A popular perception of youth gangs is that they create much of the 
strife that the poor inner cities experience.  Most scholars, the media, and policy makers 
alike seem to suggest that eliminating gangs would help to curb violence within the gang-
infested areas.  Certainly any reasonable person would acknowledge that gang members 
do participate in both violent and property-based crimes.  However, a scant literature has 
considered the impetus behind youth gang formation.  Likewise, few scholars have 
studied whether gangs actually cause a net increase in crime compared to situations 
where gangs are absent. 
According to economic theories of government formation, in the vacuum of 
power that exists in anarchy, individuals having a comparative advantage in violence will 
form private protection agencies.  These groups will gain control over a certain 
geographical area and coerce the population into paying the agency for the protection 
                                                 
3 Miller (2001) reports that smaller cities, especially those with populations below 10,000, have seen much 
more growth in gang-related activity than their larger counterparts between the 1970s and the 1990s.   
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services it provides – akin to a government.  Because of the limited protection provided 
to urban youth and young adults by legitimate government law enforcement agencies, 
there exists a significant amount of anarchy in the inner-city.  Due to the presence of this 
violence and anarchy, it seems natural for youth to seek assistance from protection firms 
(a.k.a., “gangs”) as a way of obtaining a higher level of personal safety.  So, in lieu of a 
more effective government supply of safety to urban youth, gangs will continue to thrive 
in violent city neighborhoods. 
As I have indicated in this introduction, religion, altruism (and charitable giving), 
and youth crime are important and relevant for study by economists.  As will be shown in 
the following chapters, empirically studying these topics is perhaps more challenging 
than more traditional fields because of the lesser availability of reliable data.  Despite this 
shortfall, with a bit of creativity (and possibly a sense of humor), advances in knowledge 





Risk, Discounting, and Religious Choice:  Evidence from Panel Data  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Economists generally assume that individuals make choices based on rational, self-
interested behavior.  The economics literature on religion is no different in that it is 
largely based on the idea that people rationally choose to be religious – attend religious 
worship services, contribute money to religious organizations, and act religiously (by 
reading religious literature, praying, and teaching the beliefs to others) – based on 
expected costs and benefits and the timeframe in which those costs and benefits are 
incurred.  This chapter seeks to add to the economics literature on religion by presenting 
evidence that an individual’s religious belief is to some degree dictated by his risk 
tolerance and rate of time preference.  I test the hypothesis that individuals who exhibit 
risk-averse behavior will be more likely to express stronger religious beliefs (through 
more frequent church attendance) than those that behave in a more reckless fashion.  In 
addition, this chapter analyzes the effects that time preferences have on religious 
behavior.  My hypothesis is that, because of the delayed gratification of the afterlife, 
individuals that discount the future less will tend to be more religious than those that that 
prefer more immediate payoffs.  The results indicate that religious belief serves to some 
degree as an insurance policy that protects an individual’s afterlife payoff. 
Religion is a very relevant subject for study by economists because of the many 
choices individuals make regarding their scarce resources that are based on religious 
beliefs.  In the United States, over $80 billion was donated to religious organizations in 
2003.  This is nearly 1 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.  Among Christians, 
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who make up approximately 80 percent of the U.S. population, 40 percent report 
attending worship services on a weekly basis.  This means that every Saturday and 
Sunday (the days of worship for Christians), around 90 million people are devoting hours 
of leisure time to religious worship.  Finally, individuals base many of their political 
choices, including voting, political participation (rallies, letter writing campaigns), and 
contributions to political action committees, on the religious beliefs they embrace.  The 
growing economic literature on religion is a testimony to the relevance that economists 
now give to the  effects of religion on economics and vice versa. 
A handful of theoretical and empirical studies have considered the link between 
risk tolerance and religion.  Except for a casual mention, even fewer have addressed the 
role that discounting plays in an individual’s decision to devote scarce resources towards 
the practice of religion.  The basic reasoning is that, due to the uncertainty of the 
existence of an afterlife, individuals having a lower risk tolerance are likely to buy more 
afterlife insurance than less risk-averse individuals.  This afterlife, according to the 
beliefs of the most popular U.S. religions, is attained after death (an event whose timing 
usually occurs with uncertainty).  So, those individuals that have a higher discount rate 
for the future will tend to buy less afterlife insurance, because current-period 
consumption is so important compared to consumption in the future. 
Miller and Hoffman (1995) try to determine the driving forces behind the 
discrepancy between the rates of male and female religious belief.  Their conclusion is 
that, even among males and females separately, risk plays some role in determining one’s 
level of religious belief.  Their results, however, are based on cross-sectional data.  In this 
chapter, I use panel data from the 1970 to 1972 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
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Dynamics, in addition to state-level church membership data to better test this 
relationship.  My results provide stronger evidence that risk tolerance is an important 
factor in an individual’s decision to be religious.  In addition, I also find a significant link 
between time preference and religious belief.  In addition to being interesting by itself, 
this finding also helps to better explain the nagging question of why religious belief and 
practice do not generally decline with education. 
A simultaneity issue exists between risk and religious belief.  As stated above, 
risk-averse individuals will buy more insurance.  However, once insured, the individual 
may in fact behave more recklessly knowing that eternal bliss awaits.  So, religious 
individuals may, in fact, take on more risk.  While the data I use does not allow for the 
resolution of this issue, it is important to state its existence. 
Section 2.2 reviews the previous literature on the economics of religion.  
Economic studies on risk and religious practice are presented in Section 2.3.  Section 2.4 
provides a brief description to Pascal’s Wager.  I lay out the chapter’s empirical 
methodology in Section 2.5 and analyze my results in Section 2.6.  Conclusions and 
extensions are given in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2  Economic Models of Religion  
Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) develop the Household Production Model, the first economic 
model of religious behavior.  The authors model utility as a function of both secular and 
afterlife consumption.  Secular consumption depends on household time inputs and 
purchased goods.  Afterlife consumption is a function of lifetime religious activities, 
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consisting of attendance at religious services.4  They assume that, if lifetime religious 
activities equal zero, then there will be no chance of the afterlife.  The probability of 
earning an afterlife is increasing in an individual’s church attendance.  The author’s find 
that higher wage-earning individuals will attend worship services less, but contribute 
proportionately more to the church than lower wage earners. 
Individuals may participate in religious activities for reasons besides that of 
earning an afterlife.  Iannaccone (1984, 1990) and Neuman (1986) establish the Religious 
Capital in Household Production Theory.  In it, they postulate that individuals accumulate 
a stock of religious human capital that is based on each person’s knowledge of his own 
religion’s practices and his connections within the church community.  Freeman (1986) 
conducts an empirical analysis that shows churchgoing male African American youth to 
be more productive (both at work and school) and less socially deviant than their non-
churchgoing peers.  Despite difficulties in measuring causality, it seems likely that church 
participation provides inner-city youth with somewhat expanded connections for legal 
work opportunities and adult mentors.5   
According to Religious Club Theory, originated by Iannaccone (1992), religious 
commodities are not only consumed by church participants.  Using a club-theoretic 
approach, he shows how adherents also produce religious goods and services.  For 
                                                 
4 Although it would be useful to include the individual’s religious charitable contributions, volunteer time 
at faith-related activities, and other religious-related activities (e.g., prayer), these items were not available 
within the data sets that were employed.  
5 The church may also serve, to some degree, as a public meeting place where members may become more 
informed of issues that are pertinent to their particular needs.  An interesting example is the role that the 
Catholic Church played in the democratization of Poland during the 1980s.  Eberts (1998) indirectly 
provides an anecdotal example of this theory.  She explains how even Polish non-believers attended church 
services in order to congregate with their countrymen and women to protest the government rule.  Lee 
(2001) points out that the Church helped to merge the varying political views of non-homogeneous groups 
into a unified opposition. 
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example, one individual’s passionate singing of religious hymns may inspire other 
adherents to sing more passionately, resulting in more overall utility for all.   
 
2.3  Religious Belief and Risk 
As explained by Miller and Hoffman (1995), religious belief can be seen as a risk 
management strategy:  individuals use rational choice to weigh the expected costs and 
benefits of religious belief and participation.  Religious faith could be considered a risk-
averse response to the potentially huge benefits of an afterlife promised by many 
religions usually at a relatively minimal cost.  Using cross-sectional data, they find that 
an individual’s attitudes towards risk have significant explanatory value for one’s level of 
religious belief.  Although only a cross-section of adolescents was studied, the authors 
provide an important initial link between religious choice and risk. 
Stark and Bainbridge (1987) explain that as people age, the perceived risk 
involved with not being religious increases.  The increased probability of death an adult 
faces as he ages motivates him to invest more time, energy, and money in religious 
activities.  Miller (1992) and Cornwall (1989) show similar results.  Iannaccone (1994) 
instead argues that such a pattern may instead be due to the individual’s accumulation 
over time of religious human capital.  So, as the individual gains more religious 
experience and more social capital in the religious community, he will derive increasing 
returns for his efforts.  To some degree, Stark and Bainbridge (1985) confirm 
Iannaccone’s reasoning in their description of Scientology - more an organized cult than 
an organized religion.  According to the authors, at a certain point in their religious 
training, individuals in Scientology have accumulated enough cult-specific religious 
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capital that leaving the group does not seem like a reasonable option.  Perhaps the same  
religious capital concept applies to more mainstream religions. 
Iannaccone (1995) explains how individuals will seek to hold a diversified 
portfolio of competing religious commodities in order to spread the risk of those 
commodities.  However, religious firms that are involved in the production of collective 
worship goods (like mainstream Christian denominations) are inclined to demand 
exclusivity from patrons to mitigate free riding.  This exclusivity reduces risk for the 
establishment by helping it maintain a fairly stable client base. 
As shown above, the effect of risk on religious practice has been empirically 
studied, albeit indirectly, through age and gender.  This chapter uses a measure of risk 
preference to determine how risk affects religious participation.  If religious belief (or 
religious activity) is, to some degree, a type of risk management strategy, then, ceteris 
paribus, individuals expressing more risk-averse behavior should be more religious (and 
should attend church more often) than risk-loving individuals.  
 
2.4  Pascal’s Wager:  An Application of Risk and Religion 
Previous studies on the economics of religion have postulated that individuals may 
consume religious goods and services as a rational risk management strategy.  This logic 
follows a similar line of reasoning as that of the Pascal’s Wager argument employed by 
Blaise Pascal in his Pensées, written in the late 1600s.  A simplified version of Pascal’s 
Wager can be written as follows:  
E(VB) = p(∞) + (1-p)(0) – C 
E(VN) = p(0) + (1-p)(0)    
 13
Where E(VB) is the expected value function of a believer, and E(VN) is that for a non-
believer.  For a believer, if God exists, the reward is an eternal afterlife with infinite 
benefits.6  The costs (C) include opportunity costs of time (attendance at church and other 
religious functions, praying, etc.) and of money (contributions to one’s religious 
congregation, travel costs of attending the service, extra dry cleaning expenses, etc.).  So, 
as long as the individual believes that God may exist (with p >0), the individual should 
still make his wager on believing in God.7  Within this model, non-believers cannot 
exceed zero benefits from not believing.  Also, if eternal damnation exists for non-
believers, as is believed by some religions, then the potential losses of not believing are 
substantial.8   
 The philosophy of religion field has a large literature dedicated to debating the 
merits of Pascal’s Wager.9  One major criticism points out that the Christian God is 
promoted as being merciful.  Thus, such a merciful deity may provide non-believers an 
afterlife despite their lack of belief.  To simplify the analysis, I assume that non-believers 
face a zero-benefit (no heaven), zero-cost (no hell) decision.  Also, several unique 
religions claim to worship “the one true god.”  Religious philosophers argue that, if there 
is only one true God, then people that believe incorrectly may have just invested their 
entire religious resources in a lemon.  For simplification purposes, I assume that the 
individual believes in the “true god,” whichever that may be.  Finally, some philosophers 
point out that Pascal’s approach is based on blatant, calculating self-interest.  If God is 
                                                 
6 As the data limits my analysis to subscribers of Christianity, I adopt the convention of spelling the name 
of their god as “God.” 
7 Strict atheists, as indicated by Rescher (1985), fall out of the realm of this reasoning. 
8 The expected value function for the nonbeliever if God sends such people to “hell” is E(VN) = p(-∞) + (1-
p)(0). 
9 Since the purpose of this paper is to examine how religious belief may be a kind of risk management 
strategy (Pascal’s Wager being only one of many such possible strategies), I will limit my discussion to 
more general attributes of the Wager. 
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omniscient, then, based on the teachings of many of the major religions, it seems that 
he/she would know if one were believing simply because it served one’s own personal 
welfare.  In this chapter, it will be assumed that religious individuals operate under the 
belief that God only cares that one believes, not why one believes. 
 
2.5  Empirical Methodology 
There are few empirical studies of risk, time preference, and religious belief due to a lack 
of data sets that include acceptable measures of each variable, especially over multiple 
time periods.  However, between 1970 and 1972, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) included questions about attendance at religious services, a risk avoidance 
indicator, and components measuring risk and time preference, like seat belt usage 
frequency and cigarette smoking habits.  Despite the age of the data set, the results will 
still be applicable to the current day, considering the consistently high levels of religious 
belief and church attendance from the mid-1940s until the mid-1990s. 
In order to test the effects of risk and time preferences on religious belief, I run 
two sets of models.  Model I estimates the effects that the published risk avoidance 
indicator has on church attendance.  Results from this model provide a general 
confirmation that risk attitudes factor into an individual’s religious belief and practice.  In 
Model II, the effects on religious belief of selected components of the risk avoidance 
indicator are estimated separately.  The findings from Model II provide a deeper 
understanding of the role of risk tolerance and time preference on religious belief. 
Church attendance, the dependent variable in my model, will serve as an indicator 
of an individual’s level of religious belief.  In the PSID surveys from 1970 through 1972, 
 15
respondents were asked “How often do you go to religious services?”  The four choices 
available to respondents were:  once a week or more, once a month, less than once a 
month, and never.  As indicated previously, church attendance may well be governed by 
other motives besides a desire to serve one’s religious duty.  By including certain control 
variables I describe below, I am able to better isolate the religious belief-based 
motivations for attending church worship services. 
The risk avoidance indicator was published in the PSID data set from 1970 to 
1972.10  This indicator was based upon a participant’s responses to questions regarding 
seat belt use, medical and auto insurance coverage, prevalence of smoking, and savings 
level.  To allow for an easier discussion of risk preferences, I convert this indicator into a 
measurement of risk preference, with a higher score given to risk-lovers.  Based on my 
hypothesis, ceteris paribus individuals with higher risk tolerance scores should attend 
church less frequently.  
Church attendance, as indicated by Iannaccone (1984, 1990) and Neuman (1986), 
may be affected by the amount of religious human capital the individual has accumulated 
over his lifetime.  As the concept includes social capital, my model employs variables to 
control for an individual’s non-Church support network and to explain his preferences for 
social and community-related activities.   
As Iannaccone (1990) explains, collective churches actually benefit from 
increased membership if the positive congestion that active members create overwhelms 
the negative congestion of the inactive, free-riding members.  To control for this effect, I 
calculate a variable that measure the concentration of the individual’s religious 
                                                 
10See Table A.1 in the Appendix for information about how the PSID derived the Risk Avoidance 
Indicator. 
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denomination in his geographical area.  Another figure to control for this effect measures 
the average congregation size of the individual’s denomination.11 
Participating in religious activities entails certain costs, like the opportunity cost 
of time.  For example, another leisure good or service could have been consumed, or 
additional labor income could have been earned.  Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) show that 
higher wage-earning individuals participate less in religious activities due to the higher 
opportunity cost they encounter.  However, there is strong multicollinearity between 
wages and several other model variables (e.g., age, education, race, gender).  To escape 
this dilemma while still considering opportunity costs, I use the previous year’s work 
hours for both the head and the spouse, when present.  Individuals also incur costs 
pertaining to travel from home to church.  To control for these opportunity costs, I 
employ a variable the measures the concentration of congregations in the individual’s 
area. 
The previous literature has found other variables to affect an individual’s level of 
religious participation.  As indicated by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and Ulbrich and 
Wallace (1983, 1984), age has a strong positive effect on religiosity.  This appears to be 
the result of a shorter payoff time on the individual's religious investment.  Ulbrich and 
Wallace (1984) explain the positive effect that marriage has on religious attendance as a 
function of the joint-consumption nature of the religious service.  So, single people may 
substitute more secular activities for worship services if church is seen as a place meant 
more for couples and families.  According to Iannaccone (1998), education is usually a 
                                                 
11 The data was downloaded from the American Religion Data Archive <http://www.thearda.com> and 
originally collected by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA.  This publication 
contains information on the number of churches and adherents to certain Christian denominations at both 
the state and county levels.   
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weak, but positive predictor of religious activity.  It is also important to consider race 
when modeling religious belief and participation, as African Americans tend to 
participate in religious services more frequently than other races.  As de Vaus (1984) and 
de Vaus and McAllister (1987) show, females are more likely to express their religiosity 
than are males.  Zaleski and Zech (1994) find that attitudinal and doctrinal factors 
between denominations can explain differences in giving and attendance for subscribers 
of those denominations.  It is important to note that only Christian denominations were 
available for the final data set.  Summary statistics for the model variables are provided in 
Table A.2 of the Appendix. 
 
2.6  Empirical Analysis 
Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, church attendance, I employ ordered 
choice estimation techniques to determine the effects of risk on religious attendance.  
According to Greene (1997), there is no reliable test so far that determines which model 
is superior, ordered probit or ordered logit.  So, I estimate my model using both methods.  
The econometric model has the following general form:12 
Church Attendance = β1 + β2[Risk Preference] + β3[Individual Characteristics]+  
   β4[Denomination Characteristics] + ε 
In ordered choice models, a variable’s coefficients do not always indicate the 
appropriate direction of its effect on the dependent variable.  To determine the direction 
and magnitude of each regressor’s impact on church attendance, I compute marginal 
                                                 
12 Since the ordered choice models are nonlinear in nature, this depiction is for descriptive purposes only. 
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effects for all significant independent variables.13  Marginal effects on middle values of 
the dependent variable are ambiguous.  So, it is important to review how the independent  
                                                 
13 See Greene (1997). 
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Table 2.1 
Random Effects Econometric Results – Model I 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Risk Tolerance Indicator -0.17848 *** -0.32000 ***
(0.00729) (0.05396)
Age 0.02311 *** 0.03925 ***
(0.00547) (0.00969)
African American 0.69313 *** 1.18373 ***
(0.16223) (0.28657)
Married -0.07982 -0.09370 
(0.16192) (0.29616)
Education Level 0.07908 * 0.14323 *
(0.04497) (0.07985)
Male -0.17584 -0.36524 
(0.25866) (0.46031)
Prior-Year Work Hours 0.00014 * 0.00021 
(0.00007) (0.00013)
Member of Union -0.00021 -0.00035 
(0.00024) (0.00043)
Social Club Attendance 0.05243 0.10504 *
(0.03288) (0.05895)
Family Members Nearby 0.08595 0.15882 
(0.08456) (0.15279)
Number of Neighbors Known 0.01431 0.01941 
(0.01790) (0.03225)
Catholic 0.93645 *** 1.70228 ***
(0.15039) (0.26827)
Average Catholic Congregation Size -0.00007 -0.00012 
(0.00001) (0.00014)
Average Protestant Congregation Size 0.00010 0.00021 
(0.00001) (0.00016)
Catholic Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00387 0.00626 
(0.00052) (0.00484)
Protestant Churches per 1000 Square Miles -0.00172 -0.00242 
(0.00024) (0.00236)
Constant 0.54480 1.07265 
(0.48975) (0.86921)
Sigma 1.72757 *** 3.08707 ***
(0.07663) (0.14237)
Chi2 Statistic (d.f. = 1) 22528.68 *** 22541.19 ***
Notes:
Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%,  *=10%.
Characteristics of Individual:
Characteristics of Individual's Religious Denomination:
Results are reported as coefficient (t-statistic);  N=3653 Observations; T=3 Periods.  
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variables affect church attendance at that the highest and lowest values:  (3) once a week 
and more and (0) never.    
Table 2.1 displays estimation results for Model I.  The estimated coefficients on 
the risk tolerance indicator are negative and significant for both the ordered probit and 
ordered logit specifications.  Marginal effects for significant variables are displayed in 
Table 2.2.  For both model specifications, the marginal effect of an individual’s risk 
tolerance is negative on the highest value of church attendance and positive on the lowest 
value.  This signifies that, an individual with a risk tolerance level of 6 (according to this 
chapter’s risk preference indicator) will be 2.4 to 3.4 percent less likely to attend church 
once a week or more than a person who with a tolerance level of.  The same individual 
will also be 2.0 to 2.4 percent more likely to never attend church.  These results provide 
strong support for the hypothesis that individuals who exhibit higher levels of risk 
tolerance will attend church less frequently than those who are more risk averse. 
The significant control variables generally agreed with those in the existing 
literature.  African Americans were between 8.9 and 13.4 percent more likely to attend 
once per week or more compared to individuals from other races.  As individuals aged 
each year, they were 0.2 to 0.4 percent more likely to attend church once a week or more.  
Being of the Catholic faith increased an individual’s likelihood to attend church services 
at the most frequent level between 12.9 and 18.3 percent.  Having other social 
connections only mattered to a small degree, and only in the ordered logit model.  Only in 
the ordered probit model was the variable indicating the household head’s work hours 
from the previous year (a proxy for income) significant.  While it had an unexpected 
positive coefficient, it exhibited zero marginal effects on church attendance.  Finally, as  
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Table 2.2 
Marginal Effects for Model I 









Risk Tolerance*** 0.024 0.011 -0.001 -0.034
Age*** -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.004
African American*** -0.089 -0.045 0.000 0.134
Education Level* -0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.015
Prior-Year Work Hours* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Catholic*** -0.113 -0.064 -0.006 0.183
Risk Tolerance*** 0.020 0.005 0.000 -0.024
Age*** -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.003
African American*** -0.071 -0.019 0.000 0.089
Education Level*** -0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.011
Social Club Attendance* -0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.008
Catholic*** -0.098 -0.029 -0.002 0.129
Marginal effects are only reported for statistically significant variables.  Marginal effects may not sum to zero 
across rows due to rounding.  Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   





expected from the previous literature, education had a small, but positive effect on church 
attendance.  Individuals having an additional level of education were 1.1 to 1.5 percent 
more likely to attend church once a week or more.   
 
2.7  Extensions 
While the risk indicator variable in the PSID is a useful start, it comprises variables that 
have value themselves both for measuring an individual’s risk tolerance and his rate of 
time preference.  For instance, the indicator consists of a variable that indicates the 
frequency with which the survey respondent wears a seat belt.  It also contains a variable 
measuring the amount of money spent on cigarettes each year.  These two variables 
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themselves are interesting indicators of an individual’s risk tolerance.  However, they 
also can provide a comparison of the individual’s rate of time preference.  An immediate 
and catastrophic death or injury is unlikely to be caused by smoking a cigarette.  While 
the probability of having a fatal automobile accident is still low, such an event is much 
more likely to happen.  So, an individual that does not wear a seat belt risks an unlikely, 
but potentially immediate death from his actions, while an individual that smokes risks a 
much more certain but also much more delayed risk of death. 
 As extensions to Model I, I evaluated separately the effect that each risk indicator 
component had on church attendance.  My a priori assumption is that each indicator 
should help reveal in more depth the role played not only by risk, but also by time 
discounting.14  Estimation results for Models IIA through IID and their respective 
marginal effects are located in Tables A.3 through A.10 in the Appendix. 
 The results indicate that both risk and time preferences play an important role in 
an individual’s level of religious belief.15  Variables that significantly and positively 
affect an individual’s level of church attendance are seat belt usage, car insurance 
coverage, and a variable indicating the proportion of income one has in a savings 
account.  On the other hand, the amount spent on cigarettes per year has a negative effect 
on church attendance.  The positively signed variables all describe actions that require a 
relatively small, but immediate payment.  In return, the individual gains some level of 
assurance against an unlikely, but potentially catastrophic event.  Smoking, in contrast, is 
an activity that provides the individual with immediate pleasure (or at least temporary 
relief from the nagging cravings for nicotine), while exacting a larger, higher-probability  
                                                 
14 A special thank you to my dissertation committee for pointing this out. 
15 Recall again that these results do not apply to atheists and agnostics.  
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payment at a later time (like an early death from emphysema and/or lung cancer).  The 
religious equivalent is the proverbial sale of one’s soul to the devil. 
    
2.8  Conclusion 
Risk preferences motivate individuals to buy different levels of insurance coverage, 
participate in activities with different levels of physical danger, drive more or less 
carefully, and to maintain different portions of their respective incomes in savings 
accounts.  If risk tolerance can motivate these differences in behavior, then, with an 
afterlife of eternal bliss being an uncertain fate, it is a simple extension that risk 
preferences can also cause individuals to have different levels of religious belief.  This 
chapter has investigated this risk-religion link.  Using the risk avoidance indicator from 
the 1970 through 1972 PSID, I am able to show that risk is strongly related to the level of 
religious belief than an individual exhibits.  Individuals that participate in less risky 
activities are likely to attend church more frequently than individuals that ostensibly seek 
out more risk.   
My findings show that risk-averse individuals and/or those who discount the 
future less, may employ reasoning similar to that expressed by Pascal’s Wager:  by 
making relatively small payments at present (e.g., attending church, praying), they gain 
an increased assurance – at least according to some religious providers - of attaining an 
infinite and perfectly blissful afterlife.  Risk-loving individuals and/or those with a high 
rate of time preference attend church less frequently, placing more value on current 
earthly activities and less concern about potential future consequences.  
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Within the literature on economics and religion, there has been much discussion 
on why education has a positive effect on both religious belief and practice.  Despite the 
lively debate, little empirical evidence has been provided to explain this phenomenon.  
My findings on time preference and religious provide some of this missing proof.  Since 
education is an activity that provides most of its tangible rewards at a later time, it can be 
argued that individuals having higher levels of education also have lower rates of time 
preference.16  Since religious belief also has a delayed, but substantial payoff (according 
to religious providers), it is easy to see how educated individuals that already believe 
would be willing to invest more in religious activity than the average individual. 
                                                 




Sins of the Father: 
The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Faith-based Charitable Giving 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Faith-based charitable giving is big business.  Total charitable giving in the United States 
exceeded $240 billion in 2003.  Charitable giving to religious organizations historically 
has hovered near 1 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product since data on such giving has 
been publicly available.  The goal of this chapter is to study the role of prestige and warm 
glow motivations in charitable giving to religious ideological organizations.17  
Specifically, this chapter examines the impact that publicized incidents of sexual abuse in 
Catholic Church dioceses have had on donations to organizations that promote Catholic 
ideological values.  These organizations include the Catholic Church specifically, along 
with other Catholic faith-based organizations that are not directly affiliated with the 
Catholic Church.  A few such non-church affiliated organizations are Good News for 
Catholics, Inc., Catholic Truth International, and Catholic Action for Peace through 
Songs.  The prestige of Catholic faith-based institutions declined following the abuse 
incidents in their dioceses.  However, non-Church, Catholic faith-based organizations 
may have actually benefited from a substitution effect, due to the bureaucratic distance 
these organizations maintain from the Church.  This chapter tests the degree to which 
contributions to non-Church Catholic faith-based organizations are warm-glow 
substitutes for donations made directly to the Catholic Church.  While this chapter 
pertains directly to charitable giving by Catholics, the results have implications that 
                                                 
17 For an interesting discussion of issues related to intangible goods, see Copeland and Laband (2002). 
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extend both to other religious charities and to other ideologically-based organizations, 
like the National Rifle Association and Amnesty International.   
 There is a well-developed economic literature devoted to studying the motives of 
altruism and charitable giving.  Such motives include the desire for prestige and a 
preference for helping others – known in the charitable giving literature as “warm 
glow”.18  Because this chapter addresses issues with religious charitable giving, the warm 
glow motive also includes the fulfillment of a perceived religious duty, like promoting a 
particular religious faith or the ideals that faith espouses.  The publicized incidents of 
sexual abuse of children by Catholic clergy resulted in a decrease in expected prestige 
gained from donating to anything related to the Catholic faith.  In addition, individuals 
saw the unit price of warm glow provided by the Church increase relative to that of non-
Church faith-based organizations.  Such a increase occurred because a significant amount 
of individual donations were being directed towards the payment of legal fees and other 
abuse-related expenses, instead of either helping people in need or promoting the 
Catholic ideology.19  To remain close to their former respective utility levels, individuals 
substituted some portion of giving away from the Church and into these other 
organizations.  However, the total effect on giving to non-Church organizations is 
ambiguous, depending on whether the negative prestige effect or positive warm glow 
effect dominates. 
  Anecdotal evidence presented by news media sources suggests that many Church 
dioceses have seen declines in donations from their respective congregations due to the 
                                                 
18 Andreoni (1993) even introduces the concept of Sucker Aversion – a motive for not providing charitable 
contributions. 
19 Catholics may have even felt that their contributions were actually helping to support the sexual abuse of 
children, which should have a decidedly negative impact on warm glow for most individuals. 
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publicity that local abuse incidents have generated.20  However, the discussion has not 
considered the role such abuse has had on contributions to substitute religious ideological 
organizations.  While no data is available on charitable giving directly to Catholic Church 
dioceses, published data on contributions is available for organizations that serve similar 
ideological purposes.  Combining this data with a unique database that categorizes all 
publicized abuse incidents that took place within the Catholic Church, I am able to test 
the impact such negative publicity had on religious contributions to these similar 
organizations.  My results indicate that the positive substitution effect from the warm 
glow motive overpowered the negative effect from the prestige motive, resulting in a net 
increase in contributions to non-Church Catholic faith-based organizations. 
The implications of my findings are important because they indicate that 
substitute goods exist, even when we are referring to less tangible items, like prestige, 
religion, and ideology.  My results also confirm that charitable giving is driven by several 
motives, including the acquisition of prestige and warm glow.  Finally, for the markets 
housing these ideological goods, it is efficient for there to exist alternative providers of 
the same or similar ideologies.  So, free-markets for religious and political ideas are 
utility-enhancing for the participants of those markets. 
Section 3.2 introduces the economic models of altruism and charitable giving.  
Empirical models of religious charitable giving are summarized in Section 3.3.  I present 
my theoretical and empirical models in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.  The results of 
my empirical analysis are discussed in Section 3.5.  Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
                                                 
20 Two of several examples include:  (1) Eltman, Frank.  2004.  “Child Advocate Urges Church Donation 
Boycott,” AP Wire, February 11 and (2) Paulson, Michael.  2004.  “Archdiocese sets $10.M as its Annual 
Fund-raising Goal,” The Boston Globe, April 30. 
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3.2  Economic Models of Altruism and Charitable Giving 
Before I provide my empirical methodology, it is instructive for me to present a basic 
introduction to the economic models that have been developed to explain charitable 
giving.  While altruism and charitable giving are often interpreted as selfless acts by the 
general public, empirical tests of the current theories confirm that altruistic actions are 
just another form of self-interested behavior.   
According to sociobiological theories, an individual will perform an altruistic act 
toward a genetically linked individual when the benefit to the relative exceeds a certain 
fraction (determined by the percent of genes the two share) of the loss to the altruist.  In 
the model from Becker (1974), an individual’s utility is increasing in other individuals’ 
utilities.  This model has interesting implications for transfers between the individual and 
those with whom he has close relations (like family, friends, and special groups).  
Although this model has some testable implications, it does not explain why so many 
people assist others that are strangers, as in the case of charities. 
Becker (1976) uses an economic model of altruism to illustrate the survival of 
altruists.  As the model contains social interaction, the advantages of altruism are 
explained by the beneficiaries’ desires to protect the altruist from harm.  The self-
interested altruist gains fitness due to this increased protection, resulting in favorable 
natural selection.  Samuelson (1993) provides another example of such a model.  
However, these biological models have not held up to empirical scrutiny. 
 Charitable giving is just a form of altruism.  Individuals provide monetary 
donations to strangers either directly or through organized charitable institutions.  
Although much of the charitable giving literature pertains to the effect that changes in 
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marginal tax rates have on individual charitable contributions, there is also a good deal of 
theoretical literature on why people part with resources that go effectively to strangers.   
 Individuals may contribute to certain causes to obtain implicit membership in 
exclusive philanthropic groups.  Chiswick (1991) develops a club-theoretic model to 
explain altruism to strangers by linking club members’ respective utility functions.  
Harbaugh (1998) introduces the Prestige Motive Theory.  This model considers 
both an intrinsic benefit and a prestige benefit for the contributor.  The author finds that 
donors significantly value prestige as a benefit of giving.  A much earlier work that 
considers the effect of prestige on altruism is Landes and Posner (1978).  The authors 
look into the formation of Good Samaritan Laws.  They argue that a model of reciprocal 
altruism by itself should not be a significant explanation for charitable and altruistic 
activity.  Instead, they discuss how recognition is an attractive reward for altruists.  
Because of this prestige-seeking motive, Landes and Posner (1978) conclude that such 
laws may actually result in fewer rescues because the public will interpret the person’s 
altruism as being done in order to avoid prosecution, instead of to act heroically. 
According to the Warm Glow Theory, developed by James Andreoni, individuals 
supply charitable contributions because they derive pleasure in helping other individuals.  
Andreoni (1989) models the propensity to donate into egoistic and altruistic motives in 
order to determine how government donations affect private giving.  The author 
concludes that government contributions are imperfect substitutes for private gifts due to 
this warm glow effect.  The experimental model developed by Andreoni (1993) shows 
how individuals can derive pleasure from contributing to a public good.   
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Sucker Aversion, a term developed by Andreoni (1993), actually helps to confirm 
the warm glow concept.  According to Andreoni (1993), individuals attempt to avoid 
being fooled into contributing to a cause that is in some way misrepresented.  This 
indicates that contributors really do care that their money is used to help other people.  
Walker (2002) reports similar results, with 84 percent of people in the United Kingdom 
expressing the need for a high level of trust in a charity prior to contributing.  
 
3.3  Empirical Studies of Religious Charitable Giving 
There exist a handful of papers that empirically study religious charitable giving.  These 
studies implement a variety of methods and employ quite different kinds of data.  The 
conclusions they reach also vary widely.  Some have used micro-level data to exact 
differences in individual giving patterns.  Others have looked at issues related to the 
organizations themselves. 
Sullivan (1985) uses a simultaneous equations approach to investigate the 
determinants of an individual giving level.  The author finds that church attendance, 
congregation size, and tax incentives are important contributing factors to religious 
charitable giving levels.  Zaleski and Zech (1994) look at the differences between 
Catholic and Protestant charitable giving.  The authors determine that parish size and 
membership attitudes of the parish have the largest impact on per capita giving in the 
Catholic Church.  According to Weisbrod (1988), an organization’s characteristics, like 
fundraising expenses and duration of existence, along with the demographics of its 
supporters, play a role in the level of donations it receives.  Greeley (1987) provides a 
less technical analysis of Catholic Church donation revenues.  The author explains the 
 31
decrease in the Church’s contributions between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s as 
primarily due to organizational problems, like leadership failures and membership 
alienation.   
 
3.4 Modeling Religious Ideological Goods 
As indicated earlier, there are several motivations behind individual charitable giving, 
including the desire for prestige, and the satisfaction of helping others (a.k.a., warm 
glow).  Before conducting an empirical investigation of the impact of abuse on faith-
based charitable giving, it is important to discuss how these motivations work.  Because 
the abuse occurred within the Catholic Church, any association with Catholicism will 
tarnish an organization’s reputation to some degree.  As the prestige of giving to such 
institutions declines, charitable contributions to Catholic faith-based organizations, both 
the Catholic Church and non-Church affiliated institutions, will decline.   
On the other hand, individuals are also motivated by a desire to experience a 
certain amount of warm glow.  For Catholics, some of this is generated from supporting 
organizations that promote the ideals of the Catholic faith.  Another portion of the warm 
glow experience is derived from helping other individuals.  Due to the abuse incident, 
individuals gain less warm glow from giving the same amount of money to the Church.  
So, the price per unit of warm glow, generated by giving to one’s church congregation, 
increases.  This unit price increase drives individuals to seek lower cost alternatives.  
Non-church affiliated Catholic organizations fulfill this role.  Because they are not 
directly connected to the Church (and, thus, not involved in the abuse), these faith-related 
organizations continue to provide a lower cost option for Catholics to attain the desired 
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level of warm glow (from helping others and supporting the Catholic ideology).  So, 
Catholics will substitute some religious charitable giving away from their church 
congregations and into these faith-related organizations.  The effect of this behavior on 
contributions to the Catholic Church itself is unambiguously negative.  However, the 
negative prestige effect and positive substitution effect together exhibit an ambiguous net 
effect on giving to non-Church Catholic faith-based organizations. 21  That is, they will 
increase if the substitution effect dominates, and will decrease if the prestige effect is 
stronger. 
To improve the understanding of this relationship, suppose, for example, that the 
Catholic Church receives positive publicity for one of its actions, like the opening a new 
homeless shelter.  In such a situation, the prestige effect would be positive both for the 
Church and all other Catholic faith-based organizations.  However, in this situation, the 
price of warm glow would decrease for the Catholic Church relative to the other 
organizations.  So, individuals will substitute contributions into the Church from these 
other organizations.  The effect on giving to the Catholic Church is positive.  The net 
effect of this positive publicity on the other organizations is ambiguous, with the 
direction determined both by the intensity of the positive publicity and the relative degree 
of substitution between the two organizations.22 
 
                                                 
21 Thanks to Russ Sobel for pointing out this explanation. 
22 Another way to explain this situation, indicated by Ron Balvers, is to determine whether religious faith-
based charitable organizations are substitutes or complements for church institutions that represent the 
same faith. 
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3.5  Empirical Methodology 
Prior to discussing the data used in this chapter, I will clarify the hierarchical nature of 
the data employed.  The basic elemental unit of the Catholic Church is the parish.  A 
typical parish maintains a house of worship (the church you see on the corner), a certain 
number of religious leaders (priests), and the parish auxiliary staff.  A certain number of 
parishes belong, and are subservient to a diocese (headed by a bishop) or an archdiocese 
(headed by an archbishop).23   The Catholic Church in the United States comprises 176 
dioceses.  All, except 2 of those dioceses comprise one or many whole counties.  
Therefore, discarding those 2 exceptions, county-level data is mutually exclusive to each 
diocese and can therefore be summed when the diocese in fact contains more than one 
county.  Publicized abuse incidents by diocese are presented in Table A.11 in the 
Appendix. 
My variable of interest – a binary variable indicating a publicized incident of 
alleged sexual abuse - is from a database on clergy crimes available on the website of 
Survivors First.24  Located in Boston, Survivors First was created by concerned Catholic 
and non-Catholic individuals in 2002 with the aim of, among other things, serving as a 
clearinghouse on clergy sexual abuse and related crimes.  The organization maintains a 
comprehensive database of all publicly known abuse crimes and abuse allegations, 
collected from reputable newspapers and legal documents.25  Included with each abuse 
incident is the diocese in which the abuse occurred, the source and date of publication, 
and the current status of the incident.  Wide-scale, nationwide reporting of abuse within 
                                                 
23 To simply the analysis, diocese will be employed to signify itself and archdioceses. 
24 http://www.survivorsfirst.org. 
25 See the following article for more information on this organization:  Rezendes, Michael.  2002.  
“Advocates for Victims Release Priest Names,” Boston Globe, November 13.  
 34
the Catholic Church began in earnest in early 2001.  Prior to this national reporting, most 
abuse events were only reported on locally.  Studying the incidents from before 2001 
reduces the amount of noise likely caused by national reporting.  So, a pre-2001 abuse 
incident in one diocese should have a negligible effect on charitable contributions within 
other dioceses.   
To measure the effect of the abuse on charitable contributions to non-Church 
Catholic faith-based organizations, I use an unbalanced panel data set spanning 1990 to 
2001 from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS)26.  Among the variables 
included within this data set are annual organization contribution levels and the date 
when the organization’s tax-exempt status was approved.  Because this data contains 
county-level geographic identifiers, I am able to merge this data with the diocesan-level 
abuse data.27  The data include all nonprofit organizations that seek 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Such organizations must file IRS Form 
990 in any fiscal year in which their gross receipts exceed $25,000.  Among those 
excluded from filing include religious congregations and organizations that are directly 
affiliated with these congregations.  Therefore, the Catholic Church parishes and dioceses 
described above will not be included among this data.  What this exclusion allows, 
though, is a solid test of how contributions to non-Church affiliated organizations 
changed due to the sexual abuse incidents.   
Pollak (1997) provides a methodology for finding all religious faith-related 
organizations within the IRS Business Master File.  His approach is based on the 
assumption that an organization’s primary or secondary name (as listed in the database) 
                                                 
26 The panel data set is created by merging the IRS Business Master File with each year’s NCCS Core File. 
27 The best available micro-level religious contributions data is available over a very limited time period.  
Also, the lowest level geographical indicator for the individual is the Census Region.   
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will contain at least one of several religion-affiliated keywords.  Using a modification of 
his approach, I selected certain keywords that Catholic faith-related organizations will 
likely report in these database fields.  To ensure that no organization was overlooked, I 
also selected all organizations that classified themselves as Roman Catholic Religion-
Related.28   
Some organizations in the data set are headquarters of nationally recognized 
charities.  As they receive contributions from both inside and outside the diocese, they 
would introduce white noise into the analysis.  Therefore, I removed any organizations 
whose contributions exceeded $1,000,000 in any year of the data.   




















  (1) 
where t indicates the time period, and i, j, and k represent data at the organization, 
county, or diocese level, respectively.  The number of lags is denoted by p.  Except for 
Abuse and Organization_Age, all variables are in natural log form.  Again, the variable of 
interest includes Abuse, along with its respective lags.  This binary variable equals one 
for a diocese during the year when an abuse event pertaining to that diocese was 
publicized.  Thus, within the panel data set, all organizations located in the diocese 
during the time of the abuse would be affected by the publicity. 
The model in this chapter includes current-year contributions as the dependent 
variable and price and income as independent variables.  Such a specification, first 
employed by Clotfelter (1985) and widespread throughout the charitable giving literature, 
                                                 
28  National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Classification Code:  X22. 
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allows for the estimation of price and income elasticities.  Because I am using aggregate 
data, I substitute county-level per capita personal income for individual income.  This 
assumes that each organization receives its contributions from the county in which it is 
located.  Removing large organizations from the data set, as I explained above, seems 
like a reasonable method to limit the contributions to the organization from outside areas.  
The contribution and per-capita personal income figures are converted into 2000 
dollars.29 
The tax price is derived by taking one minus the maximum marginal Federal tax 
rate for that time period.  This method is used by Partha (2002) due to the lack of 
individual tax information from aggregate data.  The highest marginal tax rate is the most 
reasonable figure to utilize for calculating the tax price of giving because wealthier 
individuals have the greatest impact on charitable contributions.  Because of the tax-
deductibility of charitable contributions, an increase in the current period’s tax price of 
giving (and subsequent decrease in the top marginal tax rate) should result in a decrease 
in charitable giving.   
Following Weisbrod (1988), Organization_Age is a variable used to control for an 
organization’s reputation effects.  All else equal, an organization with longer ties to the 
community should have an advantage in raising money over newer institutions.  I 
calculate each organization’s age using the current panel year minus the year when the 
entity was approved for tax-exempt status. 
Finally, I included a variable to take into account the effect that the size of the 
Catholic population has on contributions to the Catholic faith-based organizations.  The 
                                                 
29 I use the Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-Type Price Index Less Food and Energy from the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  (http://www.bea.gov).   
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American Religious Data Archive and the Glenmary Research Center provide data on the 
number of adherents to Catholicism within each county.30  The adherent data is only 
available for the years 1990 to 2000.  So, to generate adherent data for other years, I 
assume a constant growth rate (calculated using the published data), and calculate the 
number of adherents based on that growth rate.  Table A.12 of the Appendix provides 
descriptive statistics for the model data I employ. 
 
3.5  Empirical Analysis 
I estimated both random and fixed effects models to explore this panel data set, testing 
various lag lengths of the Abuse variable.  Results from the Hausman Test provided 
strong results favoring the fixed effects models.  Due to the volume of results from the 
various models, I present results in Table 3.1 that provide the most valid and interesting 
interpretations of the data.   
The model indicates that an incident of diocesan sexual abuse increased charitable 
contributions to organizations within that diocese.  This result is significant across all 
models for the year in which the abuse occurred.  This positive impact on charitable 
contributions, however, persists for two years beyond when the abuse incident was 
publicized.  While the result on the first post-abuse year becomes insignificant, the 
second post-abuse year result is highly significant.  While additional lagged values of 
Abuse are positive, but insignificant, the results on years 0 and 2 remain positive and 
highly significant throughout. 
 There is a clear economic interpretation of this finding:  the organizations in this 
data set are strong enough warm glow substitutes for the Catholic Church that this 
                                                 
30 An adherent is considered an active member of the church community. 
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substitution effect overwhelms the negative prestige effect that affects all Catholic faith-
related organizations.  Recall that the data used in this model is only for Catholic faith-
related organizations.  While the organizations are related to the Catholic Church in 
ideology, they are not directly related to the Church.  So, when the abuse incidents were 
publicized, individuals shifted some of their charitable consumption out of the Catholic 
Church and into similar, though unaffiliated, organizations.  It appears clear that the 
abuse events decreased the marginal utility of warm glow giving to the Catholic Church, 
resulting in a shift of some contributions to more utility-enhancing organizations.   
 All of the control variables were the expected signs with levels of significance of 
at least 10 percent.  Variables exhibiting a positive effect on charitable contributions 
include:  per-capita personal income, the age of the charitable organization, and the ratio 
of Catholic adherents to the total county population.  As anticipated, the tax price of 
giving negatively affected contributions.
 39
Table 3.1 
Estimation Results for Panel Data Models 
Dependent Variable:  Contributions(t) 
Variable
Abuse(t) 0.07596 * 0.06729 * 0.07954 * 0.07663 * 0.10213 ** 0.09089 **
(0.04074) (0.04018) (0.04066) (0.04066) (0.04176) (0.04100)
Abuse(t-1) - - 0.02098 0.02179 0.05189 0.04974 
- - (0.04172) (0.04101) (0.04254) (0.04166)
Abuse(t-2) - - - - 0.15734 *** 0.15760 ***
- - - - (0.04257) (0.04174)
Tax_Price(t) -0.29058 *** -0.07757 * -0.29391 *** -0.07860 * -0.29339 *** -0.07840 *
(0.06114) (0.04566) (0.06114) (0.04566) (0.06112) (0.04565)
PCPI(t) 0.47917 *** 0.57391 *** 0.47484 *** 0.57455 *** 0.46344 *** 0.56718 ***
(0.12661) (0.0496) (0.12661) (0.04962) (0.12662) (0.04965)
Organization_Age(t) 0.01706 *** 0.00021 **  0.01727 *** 0.00022 ** 0.01731 *** 0.00022 **
(0.00371) (0.00009) (0.00371) (0.00009) (0.00371) (0.00009)
Catholic_Conc(t) 3.32947 * 2.89172 ** 3.32931 * 2.89605 ** 3.35099 * 2.90946 **
(1.83844) (1.34963) (1.83775) (1.34942) (1.83727) (1.34923)
Lagrange Multiplier Test (df=1)
Hausman Test (df=5,6,7)

























3.6  Implications and Conclusion 
While the sexual abuse scandal appears to have decreased overall donations to the 
Catholic Church, similar but unaffiliated organizations that promote the Catholic 
religious ideology have actually benefited.  This chapter examines the impact that abuse 
incidents have had on giving to Catholic faith-related organizations located within the 
diocese in which the abuse occurred.  My results indicate that charitable contributions to 
these organizations increased after the incidents of abuse occurred.  This is important in 
that it confirms that Catholic faith-based organizations are strong warm glow substitutes 
for Catholic Church congregations.   
My analysis uses a demand function for charitable giving, with contributions 
dependent on price and income, along with a binary variable indicating the presence of an 
abuse incident.  Using an unbalanced panel of contributions data for a large number of 
Catholic faith-related organizations, I examine the impact that abuse incidents have on 
faith-related charitable giving.  My reasoning is based on established models of charitable 
giving that explain individual charity motives based on rational self-interest. 
These results confirm that individuals treat religious ideological goods as any 
other good.  So, when the quality of one ideological good declines, provided a sufficient 
substitute good is available, the individual will switch some portion of his consumption to 
the substitute good.  Another implication is that, for ideological markets to be efficient, it 
is important for there to exist alternative providers of the ideology.  So, if the quality of 
one good decreases, consumers will be able to purchase a similar good from another 
provider.  These results should apply not only to religious organizations, but to other 
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ideologically based groups, like the National Rifle Association and the American Civil 
Liberties Union. 
The driving force behind the increased contributions to non-Church faith-based 
organizations is the strength of the positive warm glow effect relative to that of the 
negative prestige effect.  Because the net effect in this case is positive, Catholics gain a 
substantial level of warm glow from supporting their faith and providing happiness to 
other individuals.  However, it is also possible for, in other situations, there to be a net 
decrease in contributions to substitute organizations if the amount of positive warm glow 
is insufficient to compensate for the negative prestige from bad publicity.  For example, if 
individuals contribute to an ideological cause mainly for prestige reasons (making it a 
“prestige good”), then negative publicity towards one prominent organization may result 
in lower giving to all organizations related to the cause.  In contrast, giving driven 






Youth Gangs as Governments: Implications for Violent Crime 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In the early 1970s, fewer than 300 cities cited having problems with youth gangs.31  Since 
then, gangs have been identified in all 50 states, with over 2,500 cities reporting problems 
by the late 1990s.32  Anecdotal evidence, along with casual empirical correlation, has led 
many people to hold a strong belief that youth gangs are a serious problem because areas 
with more gang activity tend to have higher rates of violent crime committed by youths.  
Simply put, the commonly accepted wisdom is that gangs cause violence.  In this chapter 
we propose and test a hypothesis suggesting that the causal relationship between youth 
violence and gang activity is exactly opposite of what is commonly accepted.  We 
propose that the failure of government to protect the rights of younger individuals from 
violence committed by other youths has led to the formation of gangs as a protective 
agency in areas with high pre-existing rates of violent crime.  While gangs, like 
governments, use violence to enforce their rules, the net impact of gangs (and 
governments) is to lower the amount of violent crime. 
 Our analysis is solidly founded in the economic literature on the formation and 
evolution of ‘governments’ from a situation of anarchy developed by Nozick (1974) and 
Buchanan (1975).33  These authors, particularly Nozick, explain how and why infant 
governments evolve as protection firms in the anarchistic ‘Hobbesian Jungle’ 
                                                 
31 Curry, Ball, and Fox (1996) provide a methodology for estimating data on gangs, gang membership, and 
gang-related criminal activity. 
32 Miller (2001) reports that smaller cities, especially those with populations below 10,000, have seen much 
more growth in gang-related activity than their larger counterparts between the 1970s and the 1990s.  
33 For a good summary and review of this literature, see Gordon (1976). 
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characterized by violence and theft.  While other authors have previously applied this 
theoretical framework to coercive organizations such as the Mafia, very little has been 
done on applying this model to youth gangs with the exception of a purely theoretical 
model by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995).   
 In this chapter we develop this youth gang application of government evolution 
theory to a much greater extent than has previously been done in the literature.  In 
particular we show that this model predicts an exactly opposite direction of causality 
between youth gang activity and the rate of violent crime than is commonly accepted.  
Our hypothesis, that gangs form in areas where there is a high rate of pre-existing 
violence as a protection agency substituting for the lack of government enforcement of 
rights, is an alternative explanation for the well-documented cross-sectional correlation 
between gang activity and violent crime.  We use empirical causality testing to confirm 
our hypothesized model.  Our model also better explains the reason why the age 
distribution of youth gang membership does not show a significant drop at exactly age 
18, but rather tapers off through the mid-20s.  In our model, it is those individuals most 
likely to be the victims of aggression from other youths (who will go unpunished by the 
government legal system because of their age), that get the most benefit from gang 
membership. 
 Finally, our results have significant implications for government policy directed 
towards youth gangs.  Just as the overthrowing or dissolving of a government in a 
geographic area would result in more violence, due to the lack of rights enforcement in 
the resulting anarchy, government policy aimed at dissolving youth gangs will not be 
 44
successful in reducing violent crime, and will in fact increase it.34  By failing to punish 
youth offenders when they violate the rights of other individuals, the current government 
legal system has created an environment where there is a significant demand for these 
private protective agencies (youth gangs).  While gangs do use violence to enforce their 
rules and protect the rights of their members, the net result of gangs is to reduce the 
amount of violent crime.  Because there will always be a market for private protection 
when government fails to protect individual rights, the implications are clear for how 
policy reform can reduce gang activity – enforce laws that protect the rights of 
individuals from violent crimes committed by youths. 
 
4.2  The Traditional View of Gangs 
Prior to developing our hypothesis in more detail, it is important for the reader to 
understand the widely-accepted view and perception of gangs among academics in 
general.  Sociologists and criminologists have weighed in most heavily on the debates 
regarding gang formation.  Spergel, Chance, Ehrensaft, Regulus, Kane, Laseter, 
Alexander, and Oh (1996) theorizes that youth gang problems are brought about by 
several community-level factors, including a lack of both social opportunities and social 
organization, institutional racism, and failures of social policy.  They claim that, 
especially in black neighborhoods, the street gang provides control and “employment” 
opportunities that are not provided by legally recognized institutions.  The popular 
perception is that gangs, like the infamous Bloods and the Crips, seek out new markets in 
which to franchise their names.  However, the empirical literature has found results that 
                                                 
34A current-day example of this is post-war Iraq, where private security firms are being hired to compensate 
for the lack of protection by U.S. and Iraqi government sources.  
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reject this hypothesis.  For example, Spergel, Curry, Chance, Kane, Ross, Alexander, 
Simmons, and Oh (1996) notes that most new gangs are not franchises.  This is later 
reaffirmed by Maxson (1998). 
 Other authors have hypothesized that gangs are little more than organized drug 
dealing firms, and that the main reason for gang existence is the fact that drugs are illegal.  
This claim is widely made by law enforcement officials.  While it is true that some gangs 
use the drug trade to help finance their activities, the empirical literature has uniformly 
provided results that reject the view that drug activity is the main reason for gang 
formation and existence.  Maxson (1995) tests the connection between street gangs, illicit 
drug sales, and violence and finds that street gangs are far less likely to be involved in the 
illegal drug trade and the associated violence than the law enforcement literature 
suggests.  The author finds that only a few gangs seemed to specialize in drug sales.  
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) describe the inner workings of a gang that, in fact, does sell 
drugs.  However, the gang charges a “membership fee” for those who wish to sell drugs. 
 One reason to be very skeptical of these claims by law enforcement officials of 
the gang relationship with the drug trade is because if law enforcement exaggerates the 
extent to which gangs are involved in drug trade, they are more likely to get bigger 
budgets.  The fact that budgetary considerations play a major role in the decisions and 
actions of police departments is now widely demonstrated in the literature by authors 
such as Rasmussen and Benson (1994). 
 That gang activity is present to a greater extent in areas with higher rates of 
violent crime has been well demonstrated in the cross section.  Based on this strong 
correlation, it is widely accepted that the way to reduce violent crime is to reduce gang 
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activity.  Inherent in this statement is an underlying assumption about the direction of 
causation between violent crime and gang activity.  An intervention that reduces gang 
activity will only reduce violent crime if gangs cause violent crime.  All protection firms 
and organizations, from the Mafia, to private security, to traditional governments, use 
coercion, retaliatory violence, and predatory violence to enforce certain rules of conduct 
and to enforce and protect the rights of their members.  However, saying that gangs cause 
violence based on this observed behavior is identical to claiming that governments who 
use coercion and violence as a means to provide protection services are causing more 
total violence than would exist without any government in place.  The gang’s use of 
retaliatory violence against someone who aggresses against a gang member actually 
results in a lower level of total violence because it creates a strong incentive for 
individuals not to initiate violence to begin with because of the fear of retaliation by the 
gang.  Within the economic model of protection services, an intervention that resulted in 
weakened gangs (or weakened governments) would result in more violence, not less.   
Actually, there are some theoretical papers that show violence decreases with 
fewer competing coercive organizations.  Buchanan (1973) explains that a monopoly on 
violence is better than a more competitive market in the protection industry because 
monopolists tend to underproduce.  So, society should experience a lower output of 
violence when one gang has monopoly power over a certain geographical area.  In this 
case, as Buchanan indicates, by following its own self-interested goals, a monopoly 
producer of a “bad” makes society better off by underproducing violence.  Similarly, in 
the model presented in Skaperdas (2001), increased competition in the violence industry 
results in decreased social welfare.   
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 Any theory of gangs should be accepted or rejected based on its ability to explain 
real world empirical observations.  As we have already discussed, the real-world 
evidence rejects the hypothesis that gangs primarily form to participate in the drug trade 
(although it may be a secondary function performed by the gang once it is organized).  
Perhaps the most useful empirical observation that must be explained by a good theory of 
gang formation is why these gangs are primarily present among youths and not adults.35 
The most widely accepted reason within law enforcement and in sociology is that gangs 
employ and recruit youth members because these members can commit crimes virtually 
without punishment because of their age.  In this framework, youths are employed to 
coerce other individuals and commit violent acts to obtain resources for the gang leaders.  
Data on the age distribution of gang members seem to clearly provide evidence that is 
inconsistent with this view, however. 
Figure 1 presents the age distribution of gang members from the National Youth 
Gang Survey.  If gang members are employed based upon their ability to commit illegal 
acts without punishment from law enforcement, there should be a large, discreet, decline 
in gang membership beginning at age 18.  Our alternative hypothesis, that violence 
committed by youths who will not be punished causes gangs to form among the potential 
victims of this violence, would predict a slightly different age profile.  The age profile our 
theory predicts would be the age profile of the potential victims of violent youth criminals 
(under age 18).  Because social groups and interactions do tend to be stratified by age, 
our theory also predicts that gangs would form among youths more than adults.   
 
                                                 
35 Interestingly, gang activity among adults is most prevalent in prisons, a place where the enforcement and 
protection of individual rights is almost nonexistent, an observation that would also reject the commonly 
accepted wisdom in favor of our theory. 
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Figure 4.1  
Age Distribution of U.S. Gang Members, 1998 





























Source:  National Youth Gang Survey, 1998
Age Range
 
 However, within our model the age distribution of gang membership should begin 
to smoothly decline after age 18 as individuals move into new social groups of 
individuals as they age. The fact that both a 16-year old and an 18-year old are just as 
likely to be the victim of a 17-year old criminal explains why our model fits this data 
better than the existing, and more commonly accepted view of youth gangs.  In our 
model, gangs as protective firms have as customers the potential victims of youth 
violence and the age distribution of gang membership is clearly more consistent with our 
view than of the view that gangs cause violence by employing youths (who will go 
unpunished) to carry out their coercive activities.  Interestingly, as Figure 1 shows, adults 
(those over age 18) comprise a larger proportion of gang members than do youths (under 
age 18).  
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4.3  The Economic Model of Gang Formation 
Lane (1958) describes how government, in its role as a “protection” firm, became a 
monopolist over the protection industry and then the entire market.  Carneiro (1970) 
confirms that coercive force, not enlightened self-interest, led to the formation of states 
throughout history.  However, the modern economic literature on the formation and 
evolution of protection firms from a situation of anarchy is generally attributed to the 
influential works of Nozick (1974) and Buchanan (1975). 
The economic model of government evolution has been applied to organized 
crime and gang-type organizations.  According to the literature on organized crime, the 
Mafia and similar organizations can serve as monopoly providers of protection when the 
state fails to do so.  No work in this literature, though, provides our unique insight that 
gangs might actually result in less overall violence.  In addition, there is very little 
empirical testing of these theories, and no tests that use a causality approach.  
Most of the literature on the evolution of private protection firms focuses on a 
situation of anarchy, where there is no other provider of protection.  Hirshleifer (1995) 
notes that some degree of anarchy is present in every social order.  As government law 
enforcement cannot completely keep violence and theft from occurring, markets for 
specialized private protection firms may develop in any level and form of society.  
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) describe how primitive states and gangs can arise out 
of a situation of anarchy.  Since the gang members have a comparative advantage in 
violence, they grab and maintain power through coercion of those who have a 
comparative advantage in production.   
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2002) develop a theoretical model to show how 
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violent gangs may become monopoly producers of violence and protection.  This occurs 
when legitimate government fails to protect individual and property rights.  The gangs 
may extort “protection” fees both from individuals that operate in the underground 
economy and from others that lack legal protections.  In fact, Levitt and Venkatesh 
(2000) describe how drug dealers in a drug affiliated gang pay a “membership fee” to 
continue dealing inside the gang’s territory.   Konrad (1999) shows how, in the absence 
of state power, gangs can develop. 
According to Anderson (1995), certain conditions encourage the formation of a 
Mafia: a loss of legitimate state power, and the presence of illegal markets.  Although a 
street gang is not a Mafia, the two criteria are typically present in poor inner cities, 
potentially aiding in gang formation, just as they do in Mafia formation.  Meanwhile, 
Skaperdas (2001) lists certain contributing factors for the birth and growth of gangs and 
organized crime, again including illegal markets along with ethnic and/or social distance 
from “mainstream” society.   
In our model, we assume that violence is a form of anarchy.  Again, as stated by 
Hirshleifer (1995), because law enforcement and individual protection cannot prevent all 
violence, some degree of anarchy exists in all societies.  However, of special concern is 
the degree of anarchy at each location.  So, we postulate that, in areas where greater 
anarchy exists, individuals will be more prone to become members of gangs.  By being 
part of the gang, one obtains the protection and “law enforcement” services of the gang 
within one’s own community.  So, if violence is inflicted upon a gang member, the gang 
will retaliate against the perpetrator.  In neighborhoods with little violence, there is much 
less need for this protection because state-provided law enforcement is more easily 
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accessible and efficient. 
There is a common misperception in society that only government can provide 
peace and order.  In fact, according to Reuter (1983), conflicts in an organized crime 
setting are usually settled peacefully.  Dowd (1997) reminds us that the "Wild West" was 
usually more peaceful and orderly than generally perceived, due to the occasional 
creation of citizen vigilante groups that enforced the legal attitudes of the day.  Similarly, 
our chapter provides evidence to show that, in the inner city, where government 
protection is limited at best, gangs form to provide more safety and order than would 
otherwise be available. 
 
4.4  The Economic Model of Gang Operation 
Not only is it important to understand how gangs form, but also how they operate once 
formed.  Spergel, Curry, Chance, Kane, Ross, Alexander, Simmons, and Oh (1996) 
describe the symbiotic nature of street and prison gangs, with both organizations acting to 
maintain control and order in their respective geographic areas.  Interestingly, the 
relatively high degree of gang activity within prisons seems also to support our 
hypothesis.  Prisons are well known for being places where the rights of individuals are 
not very well protected, and inmates can expect to get more protection of their rights 
from belonging to a prison gang than from the prison security guards. 
 Skaperdas (2001) argues that organized crime is more like a state than a firm.  
However, it more closely resembles the predatory states of days well past.  Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos (1995) show how those ruled by the gangs will tend to devote fewer 
resources towards production, resulting in a lower level of economic activity and growth.  
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This is especially true in the impoverished inner cities, where the gangs already compete 
for increasingly scarce resources.36  However, gangs may still be better for the overall 
social and economic performance of an area than anarchy.  Even when the state is 
assumed to maximize the consumption and utility of the ruling elite, Grossman (1998) 
finds the presence of the state is still a Pareto improvement over anarchy. 
According to Baumol (1990), governments throughout history have for the most 
part behaved like gangs, being “tyrannical and self-serving.”  However, he proposes that 
gangs are less like governments and more like firms serving clients.  Gambetta (1993) 
also disagrees that the Mafia is another form of a state.  He argues that Mafias are not 
centralized, they do not maintain undisputed control over a certain geographic region, 
they are not accountable, nor are they universal.  Instead, he indicates that the Mafia is 
probably closer to a business firm that provides protection services to paying clients only, 
and not to all citizens in their region.  For example, as Anderson (1995) points out, 
existing businesses that are victims of extortion may actually support the gangs because 
they exhibit some control on the entry of rival firms.  In the article by Levitt and 
Venkatesh (2000), that particular gang behaves somewhat like a business, extorting 
money for protection, selling drugs, paying a “franchise fee,” charging a membership fee, 
and taking over nearby territory.  The gang they study also goes “out of business.”  
However, as we indicated earlier, such drug-dealing “franchise gangs” are more the 
exception than the rule. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Another question, though, is whether they actually result in lower economic activity than in the case of 
anarchy. 
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4.5  Data 
While there is a strong theoretical literature on anarchy, gangs, and organized crime, the 
empirical testing of these theories is almost nonexistent.  This lack of empirics is, to a 
large degree, due to the relative dearth of data on gang-related activity.  Although data on 
gangs is improving (as evidenced by the clearinghouse currently maintained by the Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Drug Prevention), the limited time series data still hampers 
research on many gang-related issues. 
In order to test the theoretical model, we employ gang membership data from the 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Citywide Gang Crime Summary.37   The LAPD 
employs undercover gang intelligence officers to infiltrate gangs in order to identify the 
gang’s members.  In addition, these officers report on whether each member is currently 
active in gang activities or is currently absent from the gang.  Figure A.1 in the Appendix 
shows the levels of total gang membership, along with membership data for the three 
largest Los Angeles gangs:  Hispanic gangs, Crips, and Bloods.  
We also use violent crime data from the LAPD’s 2002 Statistical Digest.  This 
data is useful because it provides a long time-series to explore for a single location:  Los 
Angeles, California.  The gang membership data spans 72 months, from April 1998 to 
March 2004.    Monthly crime data is also available for 72 months, from January 1997 to 
December 2002.38  Because the time periods differ, we can only use the overlapping 57 
months of data, from April 1998 to December 2002.  Selected statistics on crime and 
gang data are provided in Table A.13 of the Appendix.   
                                                 
37 This data was prepared by the Los Angeles Police Department Bureau SEU and CRASH units and 
compiled by the Special Operations Support Division. 
38 Gang membership data for February 2002 was not reported.  For simplicity, we populate February 
membership with the midpoint of the January and March 2002 membership statistics.   
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Our violent crime data consists of the following Type I offenses: homicide, 
aggravated assault, and robbery.  39   
The gang membership data contains information on total gang membership 
tracked by the LAPD.  Data is available for total gang membership, and for several 
individual gang categories.  To test the robustness of our model, we conduct our tests not 
only for total gang membership, but also individually for the three largest individual gang 
classes.  Because of the well documented seasonal nature of criminal activity, as our 
starting point, we analyze the 12-month seasonal difference of all variables.  This results 
in each monthly observation reflecting the amount by which that variable is higher in that 
period than twelve months earlier.  The monthly gang membership and crime data are 
provided in Tables A.14 and A.15 in the Appendix.  The data are plotted in Figures A.2 
and A.3 in the Appendix. 
 
4.6  Empirical Analysis 
Because we are interested in employing the Granger-Sims causality test to determine the 
direction of causality, we need to first ensure that our series are stationary.  To test for 
unit roots, we employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test using the following 
regression specification:   
                                                 
39 According to Howell (1998), gangs are dominated by males.  The only violent Type 1 offense we do not 
report is rape because it is, by definition, a crime against females.  According to the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (to whom the LAPD reports these figures), 
Forcible Rape is defined as “The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Assaults or 
attempts to commit rape by force or threat of force are also included; however, statutory rape (without 






























αβ        (3) 
Where y is the variable of interest (in its 12-month difference form) and P is the number 
of lags determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Table 4.1 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results 
Variable Lags Lags
Aggravated Assault -2.4005 3 -5.9097 *** 2
Homicide -3.2696 ** 2 -7.5734 *** 1
Robbery -1.8818 3 -4.7064 *** 2
Total Gang Members -3.1764 ** 3 -3.9016 *** 2
Hispanic Gang Members -3.0666 ** 3 -4.1909 *** 2
Crips Gang Members -2.9507 ** 3 -5.2163 *** 1
Bloods Gang Members -2.0283 1 -5.1372 *** 1
Notes:  
Model:  ∆12
The number of lags determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  




Table 4.1 shows the results of all ADF Tests.  From these results, we conclude 
that only one of the crime variables (homicide) is stationary in the 12-month difference 
form.  The remaining crime series are nonstationary and, thus, will not provide valid 
causality results using the standard Granger-Sims methodology.  The first difference of 
these nonstationary series is stationary (results provided in Table 4.1), so we may conduct 
our tests on this transformed data series (the first difference of the 12-month seasonally 
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We set up the null hypotheses that:  (a) αp = 0 and (b) βp = 0, for all p = 1 to P.  Again, 
the optimal lags are determined by using the AIC on the vector autoregressive equations.  
Using an F-test, we evaluate these null hypotheses for each gang (j) and crime (i) to 
determine if any causal relationship exists.  Our Granger Causality results are presented 
in Table 4.2.40  
The first section at the top of Table 4.2 shows the results of the causality test for 
the relationship between homicide and gang membership.  For all cases we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that homicide Granger causes gang membership, but we can reject the 
hypothesis that gang membership Granger causes homicide.  Thus, for total gang 
membership, as well as all three major subcategories of gangs, the causality tests show 
that there is a one-directional causal relationship: homicide causes gang membership.  In 
no case do we find that gang membership causes homicide.  As the rate of homicide in 
Los Angeles increases, so does gang membership as a result, but not vice versa. 
The middle section of Table 4.2 shows the results of the causality tests for the 
relationship between aggravated assault and gang membership.  For aggravated assault 
the results are similar, with one exception.  We can again not reject the hypothesis that 
aggravated assault causes gang membership (for total membership, and for the three gang 
categories).  On the other hand, we can reject the hypothesis that gang membership 
causes aggravated assault in all but one of the cases (for Bloods).  The overwhelming 
evidence here again points to the conclusion that an increase in violence, in this case 
aggravated assault, causes an increase in gang membership, but not vice versa. 
                                                 




Gangs and Violent Crime Causality Tests 
Gang Model Lags H0:  Violence Granger-Causes 
Gangs (F-Statistic)
H0:  Gangs Granger-Cause 
Violence (F-Statistic)
Finding
Total Gang Members ∆12 2 1.2715 3.8722** Homicide Granger-Causes Total Gang Membership
Hispanic ∆12 1 1.7529 3.2341** Homicide Granger-Causes Hispanic Gang Membership
Crips ∆12 1 0.7456 4.4939** Homicide Granger-Causes Crips Gang Membership
Bloods ∆1(∆12) 3 1.0917 6.0406*** Homicide Granger-Causes Bloods Gang Membership
Gang Model Lags H0:  Violence Granger-Causes 
Gangs (F-Statistic)
H0:  Gangs Granger-Cause 
Violence (F-Statistic)
Finding
Total Gang Members ∆1(∆12) 2 0.4494 2.4984* Aggravated Assault Granger-Causes Total Gang Membership
Hispanic ∆1(∆12) 2 0.5383 2.2501 No causality
Crips ∆1(∆12) 2 0.3652 2.6943* Aggravated Assault Granger-Causes Crips Gang Membership
Bloods ∆1(∆12) 2 0.4869 1.2787 No causality
Gang Model Lags H0:  Violence Granger-Causes 
Gangs (F-Statistic)
H0:  Gangs Granger-Cause 
Violence (F-Statistic)
Finding
Total Gang Members ∆1(∆12) 1 0.0713 0.4764 No causality
Hispanic ∆1(∆12) 1 0.2691 0.3694 No causality
Crips ∆1(∆12) 1 0.0021 0.3605 No causality
Bloods ∆1(∆12) 1 1.1265 0.5362 No causality
Aggravated Assault
Robbery
(2) Lags for the Granger Causality Tests were determined using Akaike's Information Criterion.  
Notes:
(1) All variables are twelfth-differenced in order to correctly deal with the seasonality present in the crime data.  Additionally, some of the twelfth-differenced series had unit roots.  To correct for this 
situation, those series were first-differenced.  All resultant series are stationary.
Homicide
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4.7  Conclusion 
The popular perception that gangs cause violent crime is based on tenuous casual 
observations.  Although gangs and violence do seem to frequently coexist, such 
correlations do not imply causality.  Our results show that violent crime causes an 
increase in gang membership, and not vice versa.  Thus, areas with higher rates of violent 
crime should also experience higher rates of gang membership as a result of the 
increased violence.   
 We extend the models of government formation out of anarchy developed by 
Nozick (1974) and Buchanan (1975) and apply them to the relative anarchy of the life of 
inner city youths.  Our analysis is based on the observation that government does not 
adequately protect the rights of individuals from violent crime committed by youths.  
Operating out of fear, based on past violence or perceived future violence, these youths 
seek protection by forming organizations to provide safety where government public 
safety agencies have failed.   
 Our results are important because they uncover a situation where public policy, 
implemented with the best possible intentions, may in fact be harming those it was 
intended to help.  As we have shown, violent crime leads to an increase in gang 
membership, not vice versa.  If policies are enacted to break up gangs, the resulting 
increased anarchy should in fact lead to more violence among youths.  This is because the 
gangs serve as a net deterrent of violence.  In addition, as theorized by Buchanan (1973) 
and later by Konrad (1999) and Skaperdas (2001), increased competition between gangs 
will lead to additional violence.  Unless the already existing violence is mitigated, youths 
from the previous gangs will again form gangs.  However, they will be more fragmented 
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and, thus, more contentious.   
 Certainly existing laws should be enforced that protect individuals from violent 
crime committed by youths.  While law enforcement likely is active in many at-risk city 
neighborhoods, the emphasis may be too heavily focused on prosecuting those 
participating in the illicit drug trade, in lieu of more directly protecting public safety.   
Finally, it may even be possible for existing gangs to be used as a resource in 
helping the legitimate government maintain order.  If competition among gangs does 
increase violence, as exemplified by gang “turf battles”, then gang consolidation may 
actually lower violence.  In fact, perhaps city governments could establish official gang 
territorial boundaries and provide gang members with outcomes-based compensation for 
reducing violence.  Certainly such a setup would be a tough sell politically.  However, 
unless government improves on the protection it provides to individuals, youths will 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
The fields of sociology, psychology, and political science, are social science relatives of 
economics.  However, until recently, economists strayed from researching subjects 
thought to belong to these three areas.  Pioneering works by Gary Becker, James 
Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock, among others, helped to open the door for the economic 
model to be used to analyze topics in the other social sciences.  This dissertation has 
followed in the paths of these pioneers, although a bit more humbly, with the hope of 
building bridges across the artificial boundaries dividing the social sciences. 
Economic research on religion started in 1975 with the seminal work of Azzi and 
Ehrenberg.  The authors used a dynamic model that included not only future earthly 
consumption, but also consumption in an afterlife.  Although the authors found some 
interesting results, only a handful of articles on religion emerged in the economics 
literature for the next 15 years.  In the 1990s, research on economics and religion began 
in earnest, with a number of enlightening new economic explanations for individual 
religious behavior, all based on the rational and self-interested Economic Man.  These 
papers not only uncovered the role of tangible economic values, like forgone wages, in 
religious behavior, but also less tangible values like religious capital and club 
membership. 
The model of Economic Man relies on the assumption that individuals operate 
entirely out of self-interest.  So, the fact that so many individuals contribute their scarce 
resources (both in cash and volunteer time) to strangers may at first seem to contradict 
the economic model.  However, the recent economic literature on charitable giving has 
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provided strong empirical support to self-interest explanations for why individuals take 
part in charitable giving of their time and money.  Prominent explanations include 
Harbaugh’s Prestige Motive Theory and Andreoni’s Theory of Warm Glow Giving, both 
explaining charitable giving as an activity that promotes the utility of the giver even 
though it seems only to help the recipient. 
The belief that gangs create violence is widespread across the perceptions of both 
the general public and even academic scholars.  While most reasonable people will agree 
that gangs do use violence at least occasionally, seldom have researchers conducted 
anything other than simple cross-sectional studies.  The sociological and criminological 
literatures contain numerous articles discussing the violent nature of youth gangs.  
However, none have ever ventured to test whether the existing atmosphere of violence 
could have actually brought on the formation of inner-city gangs (and may continue to 
lead youths to join such gangs). 
As presented above, the existing economic research on religion, charitable giving, 
and government evolution is impressive.  However, each new piece of knowledge in 
these areas seems to uncover other areas that need to be studied further.  The previous 
chapters intend to answer the following three general questions:  (1)  What roles, if any, 
do risk tolerance and time preference play in the formation of an individual’s level of 
religious belief?  (2)  Do substitutes exist for religious ideological goods?  (3)  When 
legitimate government does not adequately protect individuals from violence and 
coercion, do individuals form pseudo-governmental units of their own for purposes of 
self-protection? 
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To answer the first question, I set up a model with variables to measure religious 
belief (by way of church attendance), risk tolerance, and time preference.  The variables 
of interest are gathered from the 1970 to 1972 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics.  Employing ordered choice models, due to the nature of the dependent 
variable, I find that individuals engaging in more risk-averse behaviors tend to have 
stronger religious beliefs.  My results also indicate that individuals who discount the 
future less are also likely to expend more current resources on religious activities in 
exchange for a more certain attainment of an afterlife. 
Following the natural experiments on taxation and labor supply of the public 
finance literature, I consider the second question using a natural experiment approach.  
Using data on publicized incidents of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, I investigate 
how such incidents affected charitable giving to organizations that are ideological 
substitutes for the Church.  Confirming basic economic reasoning, individuals increased 
contributions to the substitute organizations when the quality of the Church (in terms of 
its prestige or warm glow generating value) decreased.  This is a significant finding 
because it confirms that substitute goods always exist, even for religious ideological 
goods.  
While there is a strong theoretical literature regarding government evolution from 
anarchy, there are few empirical papers providing support for the theory.  To answer the 
third question, the primary author, Russ Sobel, and I look into gangs and violence in the 
city of Los Angeles, California.  Using data on gang membership and violent crime, we 
employ Granger Causality Tests to determine whether gangs truly cause crime or actually 
evolve based on the level of violence individuals encountered prior to joining the gang.  
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Our results indicate that violence actually promotes the formation of gangs.  So, instead 
of focusing law enforcement efforts on breaking up gangs, such efforts are better directed 
towards protecting the rights of inner-city youths.  According to our findings, pursuing 
the current course of action will only help inner-city violence to persist. 
The above chapters provide analyses into areas formerly reserved for the fields of 
psychology, sociology, and political science.  Applying standard economic reasoning to 
these questions, I have secured some interesting findings.  My results confirm that 
individuals still behave in a self-interested manner even when the rewards they seek – an 
uncertain afterlife, prestige and “warm fuzziness”, and individual security – are much less 
tangible than widgets, gadgets, guns, or butter.  However, there are continually new 
avenues of research that need to be addressed in these areas.  As I have undertaken in this 
dissertation, my intended research agenda will focus on applying the economic model to 






The Derivation of the PSID Risk Avoidance Indicator 
Household Response Points
The condition of the car in best shape is:  Good, excellent, very good, fairly good. 1
All cars are insured. 1
The family owns no cars or trucks.  (Neutralizes non-car owners.) 2
The driver has his/her seat belt fastened part of the time while driving. 1
The driver has his/her seat belt fastened all the time while driving. 2
The head is either (1) covered by some hospital or medical insurance like Blue Cross or (2) can 
get free hospital or medical care as a veteran, through medicaid, or some other way. 1
Head smokes less than one pack a day. 1
The current year's family reserve fund position either (1) is equal to or greater than two months' 
income, (2) is less than two months' income, but has exceeded that amount in the past five years, 
or (3) is some positive amount less than two months' income, but has not recently exceeded that 
amount. 1
The current year's family reserve fund position is equal to or greater than two months' income. 1
Source:  1970 - 1972 Panel Studies of Income Dynamics.
PSID published the risk avoidance figure as between zero and eight.  To generate a risk preference figure 
(RISKY), the author inverted the scores so individuals with a risk avoidance of eight have a risk preference 




Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 2 Econometric Model Data 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs.
Church Attendance1 1.81 1.18 0 3 10,959
Condition of Best Automobile2 1.72 0.54 0 2 8,053
Insurance Coverage of Automobile3 1.77 0.61 0 2 8,041
Frequency of Seat Belt Usage4 0.69 0.75 0 2 6,463
Cigarette Expenditures per Year ($) 106.18 149.27 0 999 10,959
Access to Free Medical Services5 1.60 0.69 0 2 10,786
Covered by Medical Insurance* 0.75 0.43 0 1 10,938
Number of Months of Income in Savings 2.24 1.70 0 4 10,907
African American* 0.36 0.48 0 1 10,959
Age (years) 45.18 15.52 17 96 10,959
Catholic* 0.19 0.40 0 1 10,959
Attends a Club6 0.80 1.19 0 5 10,817
Catholic Adherents / Church 1,552.88 1,091.26 0 3,585 10,959
Catholic Churches / 1000 Square Miles 19.71 40.71 0 161 10,959
Family Members are Near* 0.48 0.50 0 1 10,884
Education Level7 3.62 1.91 0 8 10,859
Previous Year's Work Hours 1,987.40 791.52 2 5,710 9,086
Number of Neighbors Known8 6.35 2.23 0 8 10,877
Male* 0.72 0.45 0 1 10,959
Married* 0.64 0.48 0 1 10,959
Protestant Adherents / Church 598.36 1,046.96 0 4,743 10,959
Protestant Churches / 1000 Square Miles 78.21 77.63 0 275 10,959
Labor Union Membership Dues ($) 91.06 214.47 1 9,999 2,467
(7)  Grades of school finished:  0 = Cannot read or write, 1 = 0 to 5 grades, 2 = 6 to 8 grades, 3 = 9 to 11 grades, 4 = 
12 grades, 5 = 12 grades plus non-academic training, 6 = Some college, 7 = College degree, 8 = Advanced college or 
professional degree.
(8)  Number of people in neighborhood known by name:  0 = None, 1 = One, 2 = Two, 3 = Three, 4 = Four, 5 = Five, 
6 = Six to Nine, 7 = Ten to Nineteen, 8 = Twenty or more.
Notes:
(1)  Frequency of attendance at religious services:  0 = Never, 1 = Less than once a month, 2 = Once a month, 3 = 
Once a week or more.
*Binary (dummy) variables.
(2)  Condition of car in best shape:  0 = Poor, 1 = Fair, 2 = Good.
(3)  Automobile insurance coverage:  0 = No insured car(s), 1 = Some car(s) insured, some car(s) uninsured, 2 = All 
cars insured.
(4)  Frequency of seat belt usage while driving:  0 = Practically none of the time, 1 = Part of the time, 2 = All the 
(5)  Medical Coverage:  0 = No access to medical coverage (free or otherwise), 1 = Access to free medical coverage, 2 
= Covered by medical insurance.
(6)  Frequency of attendance at social clubs or organizations:  0 = Never, 1 = A few times per year, 2 = Once or twice 




Random Effects Econometric Results – Model IIA 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Insurance Coverage on Automobiles 0.24093 *** 0.43288 ***
(0.07379) (0.13026)
Age 0.02319 *** 0.04056 ***
(0.00615) (0.01085)
African American 0.70655 *** 1.27130 ***
(0.18358) (0.3197)
Married -0.04339 -0.06230 
(0.1809) (0.33634)
Education Level 0.13703 *** 0.25157 ***
(0.04922) (0.08659)
Male -0.12690 -0.26189 
(0.34705) (0.60749)
Prior-Year Work Hours 0.00013 0.19474 
(0.00008) (0.00015)
Member of Union -0.00028 0.00049 
(0.00026) (0.00048)
Social Club Attendance 0.04447 0.08063 
(0.03669) (0.0664)
Family Members Nearby 0.01196 0.03142 
(0.08948) (0.16202)
Number of Neighbors Known 0.01646 0.02723 
(0.02056) (0.03724)
Catholic 0.98919 *** 1.85374 ***
(0.16538) (0.29331)
Average Catholic Congregation Size -0.00005 -0.00009 
(0.00008) (0.00015)
Average Protestant Congregation Size 0.00009 0.00017 
(0.00009) (0.00017)
Catholic Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00169 0.00242 
(0.00302) (0.0053)
Protestant Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00043 -0.00021 
(0.00144) (0.00253)
Constant -0.7465 -1.30344 
(0.55892) (0.97522)
Sigma 1.79800 *** 3.19311 ***
(0.08579) (0.15832)
Chi2 Statistic (d.f. = 1) 23645.63 *** 23647.77 ***
Notes:
Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%,  *=10%.
Characteristics of Individual:
Characteristics of Individual's Religious Denomination:
Results are reported as coefficient (t-statistic);  N=3653 Observations; T=3 Periods.  
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Table A.4  
Random Effects Econometric Results – Model IIB 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Frequency of Seat Belt Use 0.24395 *** 0.44523 ***
(0.08082) (0.14331)
Age 0.02318 *** 0.03926 ***
(0.00661) (0.01173)
African American 0.57372 *** 1.04372 ***
(0.19781) (0.35058)
Married -0.20280 -0.33085 
(0.21734) (0.40681)
Education Level 0.10315 * 0.18477 *
(0.05331) (0.09505)
Male 0.28815 0.45414 
(0.37701) (0.67261)
Prior-Year Work Hours 0.00017 * 0.00027 
(0.00009) (0.00017)
Member of Union -0.00149 ** -0.00245 **
(0.00059) (0.00109)
Social Club Attendance 0.02387 0.05306 
(0.04098) (0.07294)
Family Members Nearby -0.08048 -0.14521 
(0.10127) (0.18534)
Number of Neighbors Known 0.02338 0.03917 
(0.02218) (0.04019)
Catholic 0.90499 *** 1.63292 ***
(0.17940) (0.3191)
Average Catholic Congregation Size -0.00013 -0.00021 
(0.00009) (0.00016)
Average Protestant Congregation Size 0.00007 0.00014 
(0.0001) (0.00018)
Catholic Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00319 0.00442 
(0.00329) (0.00584)
Protestant Churches per 1000 Square Miles -0.00031 0.00039 
(0.00155) (0.00277)
Constant -0.33962 -0.51634 
(0.60019) (1.06099)
Sigma 1.80103 *** 3.23118 ***
(0.09554) (0.17802)
Chi2 Statistic (d.f. = 1) 24356.72 *** 24355.91 ***
Notes:
Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%,  *=10%.
Characteristics of Individual:
Characteristics of Individual's Religious Denomination:





Random Effects Econometric Results – Model IIC 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Annual Cigarette Expenditures -0.00196 *** -0.00348 
(0.00025) (0.00045)
Age 0.02798 *** 0.04997 ***
(0.00535) (0.00948)
African American 0.53468 *** 0.95438 ***
(0.15645) (0.27606)
Married -0.00998 -0.001916 
(0.16190) (0.29450)
Education Level 0.11128 ** 0.21166 ***
(0.04348) (0.07672)
Male -0.14275 -0.35538 
(0.25591) (0.4553)
Prior-Year Work Hours 0.00017 ** 0.00025 *
(0.00008) (0.00013)
Member of Union -0.00018 -0.00031 
(0.00028) (0.00049)
Social Club Attendance 0.06437 ** 0.11595 **
(0.03275) (0.05886)
Family Members Nearby 0.07311 0.15859 
(0.08489) (0.15262)
Number of Neighbors Known 0.01431 0.02229 
(0.01808) (0.03245)
Catholic 1.03525 *** 1.88626 ***
(0.14766) (0.26288)
Average Catholic Congregation Size -0.00007 -0.00015 
(0.00008) (0.00014)
Average Protestant Congregation Size 0.00012 0.00020 
(0.00009) (0.15328)
Catholic Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00376 0.00661 
(0.00264) (0.00466)
Protestant Churches per 1000 Square Miles -0.00158 -0.00266 
(0.00128) (0.00226)
Constant -0.22734 -0.29951 
(0.46251) (0.81582)
Sigma 1.67936 *** 2.98144 ***
(0.07319) (0.13604)
Chi2 Statistic (d.f. = 1) 22543.6 *** 22534.33 ***
Notes:
Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%,  *=10%.
Characteristics of Individual:
Characteristics of Individual's Religious Denomination:




Random Effects Econometric Results – Model IID 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Months of Income in Savings 0.07469 ** 0.13488 **
(0.02950) (0.05287)
Age 0.02639 *** 0.04633 ***
(0.00555) (0.00977)
African American 0.64535 *** 1.16595 ***
(0.16231) (0.28454)
Married -0.07392 -0.08352  
(0.16673) (0.30481)
Education Level 0.11874 *** 0.22241 ***
(0.00447) (0.07889)
Male -0.20248 -0.35262 
(0.26311) (0.46300)
Prior-Year Work Hours 0.00014 ** 0.00022 *
(0.00007) (0.00013)
Member of Union -0.00021 -0.00036 
(0.00025) (0.00047)
Social Club Attendance 0.05089 0.09516 
(0.03384) (0.06090)
Family Members Nearby 0.09562 0.18838 
(0.08535) (0.15347)
Number of Neighbors Known 0.01769 0.02578 
(0.01828) (0.03261)
Catholic 0.94766 *** 1.74080 ***
(0.15109) (0.26676)
Average Catholic Congregation Size -0.00008 -0.00013 
(0.00008) (0.00014)
Average Protestant Congregation Size 0.00011 0.00018 
(0.00009) (0.00015)
Catholic Churches per 1000 Square Miles 0.00374 0.00654 
(0.00272) (0.00477)
Protestant Churches per 1000 Square Miles -0.01590 -0.00264 
(0.00132) (0.00232)
Constant -0.52239 -0.92886 
(0.47380) (0.83261)
Sigma 1.74174 *** 3.08161 ***
(0.07659) (0.14087)
Chi2 Statistic (d.f. = 1) 22929.08 *** 22931.16 ***
Notes:
Asterisks indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at the following levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%,  *=10%.
Characteristics of Individual:
Characteristics of Individual's Religious Denomination:





Marginal Effects for Model IIA 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Never 




Once Per Week 
or More
Insurance Coverage on Automobiles*** -0.0319 -0.0141 0.0008 0.0452
Age*** -0.0031 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0043
African American*** -0.0875 -0.0447 -0.0018 0.1340
Education Level*** -0.0181 -0.0080 0.0005 0.0257
Catholic*** -0.1177 -0.0645 -0.0058 0.1880
Insurance Coverage on Automobiles*** -0.0259 -0.0061 -0.0005 0.0316
Age*** -0.0024 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0030
African American*** -0.0733 -0.0197 -0.0005 0.0936
Education Level*** -0.0151 -0.0036 0.0003 0.0184
Catholic*** -0.1042 -0.0301 -0.0023 0.1366
Notes:  Marginal effects are only reported for statistically significant variables.  Asterisks indicate the coefficient is 






Marginal Effects for Model IIB 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Never 




Once Per Week 
or More
Frequency of Seat Belt Use*** -0.0314 -0.0149 0.0005 0.0458
Age*** -0.0030 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0044
African American*** -0.0696 -0.0374 -0.0019 0.1089
Education Level* -0.0133 -0.0063 0.0002 0.0194
Prior-Year Work Hours* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Union Member** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003
Catholic*** -0.1060 -0.0606 -0.0059 0.1720
Frequency of Seat Belt Use*** -0.0260 -0.0065 0.0002 0.0323
Age*** -0.0023 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0028
African American*** -0.0589 -0.0166 -0.0008 0.0762
Education Level* -0.0108 -0.0027 0.0001 0.0134
Union Member** 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002
Catholic*** -0.0900 -0.0270 -0.0024 0.1193
Notes:  Marginal effects are only reported for statistically significant variables.  Asterisks indicate the coefficient is 





Marginal Effects for Model IIC 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Never 




Once Per Week 
or More
Annual Cigarette Expenditures*** 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004
Age*** -0.0038 -0.0018 0.0001 0.0055
African American*** -0.0702 -0.0358 0.0004 0.1056
Education Level** -0.0152 -0.0072 0.0005 0.0218
Social Club Attendance** -0.0088 -0.0041 0.0003 0.0126
Catholic*** -0.1240 -0.0743 -0.0078 0.2065
Annual Cigarette Expenditures*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003
Age*** -0.0031 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0039
African American*** -0.0586 -0.0160 0.0004 0.0742
Education Level** -0.0133 -0.0034 0.0003 0.0164
Social Club Attendance** -0.0073 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0090
Prior-Year Work Hours* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Catholic*** -0.1100 -0.0347 -0.0032 0.1480
Notes:  Marginal effects are only reported for statistically significant variables.  Asterisks indicate the coefficient is 







Marginal Effects for Model IID 
Dependent Variable:  Church Attendance 
Variable Never 




Once Per Week 
or More
Months of Income in Savings** -0.0101 -0.0045 -0.0003 0.0143
Age*** -0.0036 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0051
African American*** -0.0837 -0.0407 -0.0001 0.1244
Education Level*** -0.0161 -0.0071 0.0005 0.0227
Prior-Year Work Hours* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Catholic*** -0.1149 -0.0636 -0.0058 0.1843
Months of Income in Savings** -0.0083 -0.0020 0.0002 0.0102
Age*** -0.0029 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0035
African American*** -0.0701 -0.0183 0.0002 0.0882
Education Level*** -0.0137 -0.0033 0.0003 0.0167
Prior-Year Work Hours* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Catholic*** -0.1005 -0.0296 -0.0024 0.1325
Notes:  Marginal effects are only reported for statistically significant variables.  Asterisks indicate the coefficient is 





Table A.11  (1 of 4) 
Publicized Abuse Incidents per Year by Catholic Diocese 
# Diocese State 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
1 Anchorage AK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Fairbanks AK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Juneau AK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Birmingham AL 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 Mobile AL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 LittleRock AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Phoenix AZ 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 Tucson AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
9 Fresno CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Los Angeles CA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
11 Monterrey CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 Oakland CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 Orange CA 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
14 Sacramento CA 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
15 San Bernardino CA 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 6
16 San Diego CA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
17 San Francisco CA 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4
18 San Jose CA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
19 Santa Rosa CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
20 Stockton CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 Colorado Springs CO 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
22 Denver CO 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
23 Pueblo CO 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
24 Bridgeport CT 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 4
25 Hartford CT 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 7
26 Norwich CT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
27 Washington DC 0 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 7
28 Wilmington DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 Miami FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
30 Orlando FL 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
31 Palm Beach FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
32 Pensacola FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
33 SaintAugustine FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 SaintPetersburg FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 Venice FL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
36 Atlanta GA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 Savannah GA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 Honolulu HI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
39 Davenport IA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 DesMoines IA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
41 Dubuque IA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
42 Sioux City IA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
43 Boise ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44 Belleville IL 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
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# Diocese State 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
45 Chicago IL 0 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 11
46 Joliet IL 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
47 Peoria IL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
48 Rockford IL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
49 Springfield IL 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 4
50 Evansville IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
51 Fort Wayne IN 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
52 Gary IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 Indianapolis IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
54 Lafayette-in-Indiana IN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 DodgeCity KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
56 Kansas City KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
57 Salina KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 Wichita KS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 Covington KY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 Lexington KY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 Louisville KY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 Owensboro KY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 BatonRouge LA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
64 Houma-Thibodaux LA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
65 Lafayette LA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6
66 LakeCharles LA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 New Orleans LA 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
68 Shreveport LA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 Boston MA 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 8
70 Fall River MA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
71 Springfield MA 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
72 Worcester MA 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
73 Baltimore MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
74 Portland ME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
75 Detroit MI 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
76 Gaylord MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
77 GrandRapids MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
78 Kalamazoo MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 Lansing MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 Marquette MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81 Saginaw MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 Superior MI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 Crookston MN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 Duluth MN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
85 New Ulm MN 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
86 St. Cloud MN 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
87 St. Paul and Minneapolis MN 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
88 Winona MN 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table A.11 (2 of 4) 
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89 JeffersonCity MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 Kansas City-St. Joseph MO 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
91 Springfield-CapeGirardeau MO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 St. Louis MO 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
93 Biloxi MS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 Jackson MS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 GreatFalls-Billings MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
96 Helena MT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
97 Charlotte NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
98 Raleigh NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 Bismarck ND 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
100 Fargo ND 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
101 GrandIsland NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
102 Lincoln NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
103 Omaha NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
104 Manchester NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
105 Camden NJ 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4
106 Metuchen NJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
107 Newark NJ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
108 Paterson NJ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
109 Trenton NJ 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
110 Gallup NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
111 LasCruces NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
112 Santa Fe NM 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 7 0 1 0 14
113 LasVegas NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
114 Reno NV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
115 Albany NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
116 Brooklyn NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
117 Buffalo NY 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
118 New York NY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 4
119 Ogdensburg NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 Rochester NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
121 Rockville Centre NY 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
122 Syracuse NY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
123 Cincinnati OH 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
124 Cleveland OH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
125 Columbus OH 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
126 Steubenville OH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
127 Toledo OH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
128 Youngstown OH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
129 Oklahoma City OK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
130 Tulsa OK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
131 Baker OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 Portland OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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133 Allentown PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
134 Altoona-Johnstown PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
135 Erie PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
136 Greensburg PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
137 Harrisburg PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
138 Philadelphia PA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
139 Pittsburgh PA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
140 Scranton PA 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
141 Providence RI 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 3 8
142 Charleston SC 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
143 RapidCity SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
144 SiouxFalls SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
145 Knoxville TN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
146 Memphis TN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
147 Nashville TN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
148 Amarillo TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
149 Austin TX 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
150 Beaumont TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
151 Brownsville TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 Corpus Christi TX 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
153 Dallas TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 5
154 El Paso TX 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
155 FortWorth TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
156 Galveston-Houston TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
157 Laredo TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
158 Lubbock TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
159 San Antonio TX 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
160 SanAngelo TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
161 Tyler TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
162 Victoria TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
163 SaltLakeCity UT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
164 Alexandria VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
165 Arlington VA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
166 Richmond VA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
167 Burlington VT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
168 Seattle WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
169 Spokane WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
170 Yakima WA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
171 GreenBay WI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
172 La Crosse WI 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
173 Madison WI 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
174 Milwaukee WI 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 6
175 Wheeling-Charleston WV 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
176 Cheyenne WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.11 (4 of 4) 
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Table A.12 
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter 3 Econometric Model Data 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs.
Contributions ($) 169,079 219,206 982 1,240,920 34,999
Per Capita Personal Income ($) 25,481 7,684 8,097 83,478 28,159
Tax Rate (%) 37.7 3.8 28.0 39.6 34,999
Organization Age (Years) 17.8 16.1 0.0 101.0 35,409
County Catholic Concentration (%) 2.5% 3.8% 0.1% 57.5% 34,825
Notes:
(1)  Contributions and Per Capita Personal Income are in 2000 constant dollars.
(2)  Data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 7288 unique organizations over 12 years (1990 to 2001).
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Table A.13 
Los Angeles Crime & Gang Membership Data, April 1998 – March 2004 
Selected Statistics 
Variable Time Periods
Aggravated Assault 57 20.389 ***
Homicide 57 12.829 ***
Robbery 57 33.890 ***
Total Gang Members 57 39.219 ***
Hispanic Gang Members 57 38.569 ***
Crips Gang Members 57 43.072 ***
Bloods Gang Members 57 45.731 ***
Source:     Los Angeles Police Department Citywide Gang Crime Summary, 2002 Statistical 
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1998.04 65,578 40,612 15,667 5,679
1998.05 65,836 40,771 15,721 5,712
1998.06 65,977 40,877 15,741 5,721
1998.07 66,086 40,943 15,761 5,740
1998.08 66,295 41,066 15,793 5,787
1998.09 66,302 41,068 15,795 5,790
1998.10 66,297 41,068 15,795 5,790
1998.11 56,805 34,717 13,790 5,618
1998.12 57,274 35,025 13,848 5,661
1999.01 57,606 35,247 13,924 5,672
1999.02 57,942 35,434 14,023 5,706
1999.03 57,274 35,025 13,848 5,661
1999.04 58,943 36,140 14,211 5,757
1999.05 65,836 40,771 15,721 5,712
1999.06 59,873 36,663 14,488 5,849
1999.07 60,310 36,929 14,588 5,900
1999.08 60,596 37,083 14,651 5,934
1999.09 61,406 37,637 14,857 5,963
1999.10 61,971 37,998 15,008 5,988
1999.11 62,319 38,360 15,062 6,030
1999.12 62,782 38,554 15,137 6,032
2000.01 63,106 38,783 15,175 6,065
2000.02 63,380 38,897 15,289 6,087
2000.03 63,653 39,010 15,402 6,108
2000.04 64,428 39,624 15,528 6,124
2000.05 64,771 39,816 15,635 6,152
2000.06 64,771 39,816 15,635 6,152
2000.07 55,630 34,930 12,977 5,208
2000.08 56,126 35,257 13,050 5,233
2000.09 56,508 35,478 13,146 5,269
2000.10 56,508 35,478 13,146 5,269
2000.11 57,004 35,826 13,174 5,350
2000.12 57,360 36,071 13,186 5,377
2001.01 55,578 34,965 12,767 5,195
2001.02 56,082 35,354 12,852 5,228
2001.03 56,471 35,575 12,965 5,264
Notes:
(1)  Source:  Los Angeles Police Department website, http://www.lapd.org.
(2)  Due to missing values, the February 2002 gang membership levels were computed by the authors 












2001.04 56,471 35,575 12,965 5,264
2001.05 57,406 36,037 13,247 5,366
2001.06 57,406 36,037 13,247 5,366
2001.07 57,406 36,037 13,247 5,366
2001.08 57,411 36,037 13,247 5,366
2001.09 57,670 36,093 13,098 5,344
2001.10 56,048 34,168 13,253 5,383
2001.11 56,265 34,314 13,293 5,393
2001.12 55,385 33,762 13,109 5,317
2002.01 55,760 33,971 13,218 5,340
2002.02 56,051 34,136 13,287 5,376
2002.03 56,432 34,389 13,383 5,386
2002.04 56,432 34,389 13,383 5,386
2002.05 55,025 33,551 13,006 5,218
2002.06 55,233 33,681 13,046 5,239
2002.07 53,126 32,309 12,588 5,025
2002.08 53,431 32,493 12,673 5,033
2002.09 53,768 32,646 12,789 5,060
2002.10 51,711 31,361 12,293 4,822
2002.11 52,240 31,680 12,419 4,853
2002.12 50,497 30,517 12,016 4,700
2003.01 51,047 30,864 12,113 4,777
2003.02 51,389 31,100 12,164 4,801
2003.03 50,034 30,116 11,952 4,704
2003.04 50,472 30,319 12,108 4,763
2003.05 50,748 30,440 12,210 4,785
2003.06 51,089 30,627 12,300 4,822
2003.07 51,108 30,797 12,384 4,862
2003.08 51,664 30,949 12,453 4,897
2003.09 50,141 29,988 12,123 4,767
2003.10 50,517 30,228 12,223 4,812
2003.11 48,452 28,983 11,650 4,631
2003.12 48,289 28,827 11,661 4,620
2004.01 46,795 27,910 11,345 4,479
2004.02 47,004 28,009 11,389 4,515
2004.03 47,199 28,074 11,460 4,567
Notes:
(1)  Source:  Los Angeles Police Department website, http://www.lapd.org.
(2)  Due to missing values, the February 2002 gang membership levels were computed by the authors 
using the average of the respective levels from the prior and following months.
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Figure A.1  































Table A.15 (1 of 2) 




1997.01 45 118 2545
1997.02 48 98 2350
1997.03 62 94 3031
1997.04 43 93 2713
1997.05 37 134 3198
1997.06 33 121 2967
1997.07 60 126 3042
1997.08 47 152 3256
1997.09 51 133 3118
1997.10 58 126 2875
1997.11 43 118 2675
1997.12 39 92 2455
1998.01 38 110 2492
1998.02 31 125 2149
1998.03 40 108 2653
1998.04 23 117 2565
1998.05 23 124 2781
1998.06 36 107 2737
1998.07 38 123 3032
1998.08 50 116 3228
1998.09 30 98 2678
1998.10 34 105 2499
1998.11 31 107 2278
1998.12 45 98 2429
1999.01 33 105 2614
1999.02 30 102 2093
1999.03 37 88 2386
1999.04 25 88 2340
1999.05 35 96 2650
1999.06 29 86 2613
1999.07 41 95 2988
1999.08 50 105 2818
1999.09 30 118 2621
1999.10 41 123 2932
1999.11 34 86 2366
1999.12 35 76 2349
Notes:
(1)  Source:  Los Angeles Police Department website, http://www.lapd.org.
(2)  Due to missing values, the February 2002 gang membership levels were 







2000.01 41 114 2594
2000.02 23 92 2178
2000.03 25 108 2592
2000.04 46 111 2853
2000.05 54 132 3055
2000.06 60 140 2938
2000.07 56 115 3148
2000.08 46 145 3053
2000.09 44 99 2857
2000.10 53 99 2632
2000.11 42 85 2216
2000.12 54 102 2585
2001.01 44 86 2433
2001.02 35 70 2092
2001.03 33 96 2538
2001.04 48 90 2525
2001.05 35 119 2935
2001.06 49 140 3007
2001.07 58 121 3181
2001.08 56 129 3164
2001.09 68 119 3001
2001.10 69 118 2749
2001.11 53 88 2613
2001.12 43 93 2566
2002.01 69 100 2495
2002.02 31 99 2423
2002.03 55 99 2748
2002.04 59 88 2597
2002.05 49 110 2845
2002.06 53 104 2889
2002.07 58 102 3068
2002.08 63 118 2915
2002.09 62 92 2796
2002.10 43 93 2621
2002.11 64 97 2515
2002.12 41 116 2338
(2)  Due to missing values, the February 2002 gang membership levels were 
computed by the authors using the average of the respective levels from the prior 
Notes:
(1)  Source:  Los Angeles Police Department website, http://www.lapd.org.
Table A.15 (2 of 2) 
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Figure A.2 
















































Unit Root and Serial Correlation Test Statistics 
Variable Lags Lags
Aggravated Assault -2.4005 1.5502 3 -5.9097 *** 3.0564 2
Homicide -3.2696 ** 0.2702 2 -7.5734 *** 2.1730 1
Robbery -1.8818 0.9042 3 -4.7064 *** 0.8541 2
Total Gang Members -3.1764 ** 1.0268 3 -3.9016 *** 0.4888 2
Hispanic Gang Members -3.0666 ** 0.7050 3 -4.1909 *** 0.3548 2
Crips Gang Members -2.9507 ** 1.3301 3 -5.2163 *** 2.2328 1
Bloods Gang Members -2.0283 0.0059 1 -5.1372 *** 0.3220 1
Notes:  
ADF Test:  ∆12
The number of lags determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the following 
levels:   ***=1%,  **=5%.  Significant ADF Test results indicate the ABSENCE of a unit root.  Significant LM Tests indicate the 
PRESENCE of serial correlation.
ADF Test:  ∆(∆12)
LM Test for Serial 
Corr:  ∆(∆12)




Serial Correlation Tests – Vector Autoregression Results 
Variable Lags Homicide=>Gangs Gangs=>Homicide
Total Gang Members 2 2.4527 0.5404
Hispanic Gang Members 1 0.1764 0.4183
Crips Gang Members 1 0.1993 0.2200






Total Gang Members 2 0.8223 0.5539
Hispanic Gang Members 2 0.6489 0.4297
Crips Gang Members 2 1.0969 0.5541
Bloods Gang Members 2 1.2229 0.0679
Lags Robbery=>Gangs Gangs=>Robbery
Total Gang Members 1 0.4941 0.3499
Hispanic Gang Members 1 0.5429 0.4330
Crips Gang Members 1 0.4229 0.1802
Bloods Gang Members 1 0.2248 0.0271
Ljung-Box Q-Statistics
Notes:  The number of lags was determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  All 
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